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needed for these inquiries? This article offers a framework in which to ask, and begin to answer, these
questions. It focuses on the international community's past efforts to harmonize the law of patents. It asserts
not only that history provides context, but also, that the same history yields lessons directly applicable to
many of the treaty's basic issues. Section I discusses the immediate history of WIPO's efforts to obtain the
Patent Harmonization Treaty and summarizes the steps that have been taken to date before that organization.
In addition, it also states the current procedural posture of the treaty negotiations. Section II places this
immediate history in larger context. The international community has been grappling with the problems of
foreign patenting for over a century. Many of those problems predate the first international patenting
agreement, the Paris Convention. The article summarizes those problems. Section III outlines a set of
inquiries to evaluate the Patent Harmonization Treaty. Fundamentally, we must discern the national interests
of the United States and how the treaty will affect them. Given industry's large role in designing the treaty,
coupled with its historical disinterest in the costs of patenting, particular attention must be placed on the
increased domestic costs that the Patent Harmonization Treaty will impose on the United States.
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States has recently seen increasing efforts to har-
monize! its law of patents with those of foreign countries. Exten-
sive intellectual-property provisions exist, for example, in the 
North American Free Trade Agreement.2 The Uruguay-Round ne-
gotiations concerning the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
("GATT") have, for the first time, produced a comprehensive set of 
intellectual-property provisions in the context of that agreement, 
albeit in draft form.3 Discussions of the merits of harmonization 
are appearing frequently in legalliterature.4 
1. Generally speaking, the harmonization of legal systems refers to coordi-
nating the various rules of law in the subject systems to the point where they 
express common, minimum principles. In this sense, harmonization can be con-
trasted with the more exacting ideal of "unification" of the law which, in its 
pristine form, refers to the use of the same legal rules in each system. See 
generally 2 DAVID RENE, THE INTERNATIONAL UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAw, ch. 5, 34-35 (1971). 
2. PAUL HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 83-89 (1993). If adopted, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") would create a free-trade zone 
comprising the United States, Mexico, and Canada. All three governments 
have signed the agreement, but it has yet to be ratified. 
The intellectual property provisions of NAFTA have been reprinted in 5 
WORLD INTELL. PRoP. REP. 284 (1992). For an analysis of these provisions, see 
Seth D. Greenstein, Examination of I.P. Provisions of North American Free 
Trade Agreement, 6 WORLD INTELL. PRoP. REP. 344 (1992). 
3. In part, due to the insistence of United States negotiators, the member 
nations of GATT have resolved to negotiate substantive intellectual-property 
provisions for inclusion into that agreement during the Uruguay Round. See 
generally DONALD K. DUVALL, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE ITC 553-68 
(1992). The present text of GATT treats intellectual property matters only pe-
ripherally. Id. at 555. 
The Director-General of GATT, Arthur Dunkel, has produced a draft 
agreement in an effort to conclude the Uruguay Round of negotiations. DroIt 
Final Actfor Uruguay Round, GATT Doc. No. MTN.TNC/w/Fa (Dec. 20, 1991). 
See Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Split Regarding the Protection of In-
tellectual Property Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 108-11 (1993). The intel-
lectual-property provisions of that agreement have been reprinted at 5 WORLD 
INTELL. PRoP. REP. 42 (1992). They have been the subject of considerable con-
troversy. See, e.g., Mid-April Deadline Set for Talks; TRIPs Document Gets 
Poor Reviews, 6 WORLD INTELL. PRoP. REP. 41 (1992); Proposed TRIPs Text 
Would Limit Use of Special 301, USTR Counsel Says, 6 WORLD INTELL. PROP. 
REP. 102 (1992). 
For general discussions of the intellectual property negotiations of the Uru-
guay Round, which are referred to by the acronym TRIPs, see generally John 
Richards, Trade Related Intellectual Property Issues (TRIPS), 72 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 906 (1990); Otto A. Stamm, GATT Negotiations for the 
Protection of New Technologies, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 680 
(1991); Symposium, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, 22 V AND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L. L. 223, 689 (pts.1 & 2) (1989); GATT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 11 IIC STUDIES 
(Frederick Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds. 1991). 
4. E.g., Blake R. Wiggs, Canada's First-to-File Experience - Should the 
U.S. Make the Move?, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y. 493 (1991); Lisa M. 
Brownlee, Trade Secret Use of Patentable Inventions, Prior User Rights and 
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As a part of these efforts, the United States is now poised to 
decide whether to accept the Patent Harmonization Treaty.5 Nego-
tiations concerning the treaty have taken place before the World 
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO")6 since 1983.7 A draft 
text has been produced.8 The Paris Union has discussed the draft at 
Patent Harmonization, 72 J.P.T.O.S. 523 (1990); Charles R.B. Macedo, First-to-
File: Is American Adoption of the International Standard Worth the Price?, 
1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 543 (1988); Ned L. Conley, First-to-Invent: A Supe-
rior System for the United States, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 779 (1991). 
5. See generally History of the Preparations of the Patent Law Treaty, 
WIPO Doc. PLT/DC/5 (Dec. 21, 1990) [hereinafter History], reprinted in 
Records of the Diplomatic Conference for the Conclusion of a Treaty Supple-
menting the Paris Convention as Far as Patents are Concerned, WIPO, Diplo-
matic Conference, pt. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Records]. For discussions of the 
Patent Harmonization Treaty overall, see Edward G. Fiorito, Harmonization of 
u.s. and Worldwide Patent Laws, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 83 
(1991); Jochen Pagenberg, The WIPO Patent Harmonization Treaty, 19 AIPLA 
Q.J. 1 (1991»; William Fryer III, Patent Law Harmonization: The Current Situ-
ation and Alternatives Available, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 242, 298 
(pts. 1 & 2) (1990). 
The treaty is known officially as the "Patent Law Treaty." See, e.g., His-
tory, supra. Those in the United States, however, have referred to it most com-
monly as the "Patent Harmonization Treaty." This article adopts the latter 
useage. 
6. Generally speaking, WIPO is the organization that administers the vari-
ous forms of the Convention for the International Protection of Industrial 
Property ("Paris Convention") and agreements subSidiary thereto. See INTER-
NATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Marshall A. Leaffer, ed. 
1990). It is the creation of the countries that have adhered to the Paris Conven-
tion, who together comprise the Paris Union. WIPO replaced the United Inter-
national Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual Property ("BIRPI") in 1967. 
Id. at 563-64; see also The Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization, WIPO Pub. No. 251, reprinted in Leaffer, supra at 566. 
7. The treaty has been negotiated in a series of sessions before WIPO of 
the "Committee of Experts on the Harmonization of Certain Provisions of Law 
for the Protection of Inventions." See generally History, supra note 5, at ~ 4. In 
general, eleven preparatory sessions have been held, including an initial meet-
ing limited to the consideration of issues relating to the use of a "grace period" 
before filing. See infra notes 30-36. The following is a list of those sessions 
along with citations to the Notes summarizing each that have appeared in 
WIPO's monthly publication, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY: 
Prior meeting on grace period 1984 INDUS. PROP. 313 
1st Session 1985 INDUS. PRoP. 267 
2nd Session 1986 INDUS. PROP. 309 
3rd Session 1987 INDUS. PRoP. 204 
4th Session 1988 INDUS. PROP. 179 
5th Session, 
part 1 
part 2 
6th Session 
7th Session 
8th Session, 
1988 INDUS. PRoP. 358 
1989 INDUS. PROP. 53 
1989 INDUS. PROP. 269 
1990 INDUS. PROP. 140 
part 1 1990 INDUS. PROP. 297 
part 2 1991 INDUS. PROP. 41 
8. Draft Treaty Supplementing the Paris Conventionfor the Protection of 
Industrial Property As Far As Patents Are Concerned (Patent Law Treaty), 
WIPO Doc. No. PLT/DC/3 (Dec. 21, 1990) [hereinafter PLT] , reprinted in 
Records, supra note 5, at 11-53. WIPO has suggested various modifications to 
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the first part of a diplomatic conference,9 with the second and prob-
ably final part of the conference likely to take place soon.10 Legis-
lation has been introduced nationally that would, in effect, commit 
the United States to implement a signed treaty.l1 
Much of this activity has come at the insistence of patent-own-
ing industry.12 United States industry is relying increasingly on 
foreign sales.13 It has attributed lost profits on those sales to inade-
quate patent protection in foreign countries.14 Patent harmoniza-
tion is seen as a means of strengthening the patent protection that 
this proposal. They are summarized in Observations of the International Bu-
reau Following the First Part (1991) of the Diplomatic Con.{erence, WIPO Doc. 
No. PLT/DC/69 (Jan. 29,1993). See also Memorandum of the Director General: 
Continuation of the Diplomatic Con.{erence for the Conclusion of a Treaty Sup-
plementing the Paris Convention as Far as Patents Are Concerned, WIPO Doc. 
No. P/A/XIX/3 (1992) [hereinafter Memorandum of the Director General]; Re-
port Adopted by the Assembly, WIPO Doc. No. P/A/XIX/4 (1992). 
9. The first part of the diplomatic conference occurred in June 1991. 
Those proceedings are summarized in 1991 INDUS. PRoP. 360. See also Results of 
The First Part (1991) of the Diplomatic Con.{erence, WIPO 2d pt., Doc. No. 
PLT/DC/INF/5 (Jan. 29, 1993). See discussion in.{ra notes 52-67. 
10. See in.{ra notes 64-67. 
11. S. 2605, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); H.R. 4978, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1992); See also 138 CONGo REC. S5226-01 (introducing S. 2605); 44 PTCJ 3 (May 
7,1992) (summarizing testimony at the joint hearing on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978). 
Both bills failed to become legislation. As of this writing, however, the bills are 
expected to be reintroduced before the second part of the diplomatic confer-
ence. See in.{ra note 67. 
12. Joint Hearings on S. 2605 and HR. 4978 Before the Senate Subcommit-
tee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks and the House Subcommittee on 
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House and Senate 
Committees on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (statement of Robert Armit-
age on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers) (Apr. 30, 1992); 
Position Statement by Intellectual Property Owners, Inc. on S. 2605 and H.R. 
4978, The Patent Harmonization Act of 1992, June 25, 1992. See also First-to-file 
Does Not Win Approval by ABA House of Delegates, but Is Approved at Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers meeting, 45 PAT. TRADEMARK & COpy-
RIGHT J. 323-24 (Feb. 18, 1993). The various advisory committees that assisted 
the United States in formulating its policies toward trade negotiations in the 
1980's included heavy representation from industry. See in.{ra notes 188-89. 
13. See, e.g., Office of the United States Trade Representation, Administra-
tion Statement on International Trade Policy 2 (Sept. 23, 1985) (reporting 
growth of imports and exports, as percentage of total GNP, from 9% in 1950, to 
13% in 1970, to 21% in 1985). 
14. E.g., U.S.I.T.C., Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and 
the Effect on U.S. Industry and Trade, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 2065, 4-1 (Feb. 1988) 
[hereinafter U.S.I.T.C. Survey]; Beier & Schricker; supra note 3 (assertion by 
joint group of United States, Japanese, and European business entities). See 
generally U.S.I.T.C. Survey, at 4-3 (calculating losses for all forms of intellec-
tual property, based on survey results, at $23 billion); Statement of Secretary of 
Commerce Malcolm Baldridge on the Proposed "Intellectual Property Rights 
Improvement Act of 1986," reprinted in United States Dept. of Commerce 
News (Apr. 7, 1986) (reporting losses as "from $8 billion to $20 billion in sales"); 
Task Force on Intellectual Property, Summary of the Phase I Recommenda-
tions to the Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations 2 (Oct. 1985) [hereinaf-
ter Phase I Recommendations]. . 
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foreign countries provide.l5 
The interests of the United States as a whole, however, are not 
necessarily those of its patent-owning industries. Certainly, the na-
tion does have a clear interest in preserving the health of its indus-
try. At the same time, it is also interested in preserving the overall 
balance between incentive and cost that the patent system repre-
sents.l6 In fact, where the two conflict, reason suggests this latter, 
broader set of interests should outweigh the narrower interests of 
industry. 
This conflict raises a troubling problem in deciding whether to 
accept the Patent Harmonization Treaty. Simply put, industry'S en-
thusiasm for the treaty may not be enough. If industry's interests 
can differ from those of the United States, industry may well favor 
a particular international patenting agreement that is nevertheless 
harmful to the country as a whole. Consequently, relying on indus-
try's advice to adopt such a treaty would be unwise. 
The history of the negotiations over the Patent Harmonization 
Treaty makes this problem particularly vexing. The treaty has 
been negotiated by a small number of people outside the United 
States.l7 Most attending on behalf of the United States have been 
closely associated with industry.ls Few others in the United States 
have followed the negotiations in detail, even among the patent 
15. See, e.g., Phase I Recommendations, supra note 14, at 2-3; Statement on 
International Trade Policy, supra note 13, at 12; Statement on Intellectual 
Property Rights, supra note 14, at 4-5. 
16. For general discussions of balancing costs and benefits in patenting, see 
FRITZE MALcHUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, PATENT 
STUDY No. 15 OF THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHT OF 
THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE UNITED STATES SEN., 86th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 21-24 (1958); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent 
System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977); ERICH KAUFER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE 
PATENT SYSTEM 19 (1989). 
17. The negotiations have occurred in Geneva. An exact listing of the per-
sons who have appeared at the WIPO negotiations appears in the various Notes, 
published in INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, that summarize each meeting. Only fifty-
five persons have attended any of the WIPO negotiations as representatives of 
United States' interests. In addition, their attendance has been highly sporadic. 
Only seven persons have attended the negotiations regularly. For a more com-
plete an81ysis of the attendance of U.S. experts at the WIPO negotiations, see R. 
Carl Moy, Essay: Patent Harmonization, Protectionism, and Legislation, 74 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y. 777, 793-803 (1992). 
18. Of the United States experts at the WIPO negotiations who were not 
employees of the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), nearly 
all were either employees of large corporations or members of large law firms. 
See generally Moy, supra note 17, at 800-01. This is due in part to the PTO's 
apparent decision not to include private individuals in the United States' official 
delegations to the negotiations. Id. at n.87. Although a number of PTO employ-
ees have attended, there is reason to question whether, with regard to the 
WIPO negotiations, they represent an independent viewpoint. Id. at 800-01. Cf 
PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 
(1981) (discussing concept of agency "capture" by special-interest groups). 
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bar.19 For these reasons, decisionmakers in the United States have 
comparatively little information with which to analyze the Patent 
Harmonization Treaty. 
How, then, shall the United States decide whether to adopt the 
Patent Harmonization Treaty? What questions shall we ask? 
Whose answers shall we trust? What sources of information can 
provide us with the background needed for these inquiries? 
The following article offers a framework in which to ask, and 
begin to answer, these questions. It focuses on the international 
community's past efforts to harmonize the law of patents. It asserts 
not only that history provides context, but also, that the same his-
tory yields lessons directly applicable to many of the treaty's basic 
issues. 
Section I discusses the immediate history of WIPO's efforts to 
obtain the Patent Harmonization Treaty and summarizes the steps 
that have been taken to date before that organization. In addition, 
it also states the current procedural posture of the treaty 
negotiations. 
Section II places this immediate history in larger context. The 
international community has been grappling with the problems of 
foreign patenting for over a century.20 Many of those problems pre-
date the first international patenting agreement, the Paris Conven-
tion.21 The article summarizes those problems. 
In addition, this section describes the approach to international 
patenting embodied in the convention and the difficulties that the 
international community has encountered in using that approach. 
Section II suggests that an economic analysis explains the events 
under consideration. In contrast to a purely domestic scenario, in-
ternational activity permits greater freedom to select the costs and 
benefits that an individual national economy will receive from pat-
enting. The behavior of national governments is consistent with a 
desire simultaneously to receive large national benefits and to incur 
small costs. In contrast, the behavior of international, patent-own-
19. See Remarks of Kirk, 1991 AIPLA BULL., at 442-43 (noting lack of input 
to the PTO from other sources prior to the diplomatic conference). 
20. The international community had begun to address patenting issues at 
least as early as the middle decades of the 1800's. See 1 STEPHEN P. LADAS, 
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS - NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION 59-68 (1975); EDITH T. PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNA. 
TIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 42-59 (1951); Heinrich Kronstein & Irene Till, A Re-
evaluation of the International Patent Convention, 12 J.L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 
765 (1948). 
21. The Paris Convention came into being in 1883. See generally Arpad 
Bogsch, The First Hundred Years of the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property, 1983 INDUS. PROP. 187; Frederick Beier, One Hundred 
Years of International Cooperation' the Role of the Paris Convention in the 
Past Present, and Future, 15 IIC 1 (1984). 
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ing industry is consistent with a predominant desire to obtain bene-
fits and a relative insensitivity to cost. Many of the historical 
divisions between international industry and national government 
continue to exist today. Consequently, they are present in the nego-
tiations over the Patent Harmonization Treaty. 
Section III outlines a set of inquiries to evaluate the Patent 
Harmonization Treaty. Fundamentally, we must discern the na-
tional interests of the United States and how the treaty will affect 
them. Given industry's large role in designing the treaty, coupled 
with its historical disinterest in the costs of patenting, particular 
attention must be placed on the increased domestic costs that the 
Patent Harmonization Treaty will impose on the United States. 
In addition, Section III provides a means of intelligently weigh-
ing industry's enthusiasm for the treaty. Where industry's interests 
coincide with those of the nation, industry's view of the treaty is 
entitled to significant weight. In contrast, where industry's support 
for the treaty is colored by that groups's disinclination to consider 
cost, industry's advice must be regarded skeptically. Finally, Sec-
tion III suggests new ways to judge the law-making adequacy of the 
negotiations over the Patent Harmonization Treaty. Given the dif-
fering views of the various domestic constitituencies that patenting 
affects, issues of representation become critical. 
I. THE PATENT HARMONIZATION TREATY 
A. Procedural History 
The immediate history of the Patent Harmonization Treaty is 
related to two developments that occurred in the late 1970's. Dur-
ing that period, the European Patent Office ("EPO"), the Japanese 
Patent Office ("JPO"), and the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office ("PTO") began exploring ways to coordinate their op-
erations.22 In addition, during the late 1970's the patent systems of 
many western European countries underwent fundamental change. 
22. See Annual Report of the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, 
1983, at 14; Michael Kirk, WIPO's Involvement in International Developments, 
50 ALB. L. REV. 601, 602 (1986). Two influences appear to have driven these 
activities. First, the Patent Cooperation Treaty ("PCT") entered into force on 
January 24,1978. E.g., Leaffer, supra note 6, at 76. Chapter I of that treaty sets 
out the procedures for filing an application for patent in relatively high detail. 
Id. at 76, 79-105. Thus, the opportunities for cooperation between national pat-
ent offices increased. 
At the same time, inventors were seeking patent protection in foreign 
countries with increasing frequency. Because of the requirements of the Paris 
Convention, many of these new, foreign-origin applications were largely dupli-
cative of one another. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 119 Paris Convention, art. 4(D)(3), 
reprinted in Leaffer, supra note 6, at 22 (allowing the receiving country to re-
quire the foreign applicant to produce a copy of the priority application). Gen-
erally speaking, one goal of the national offices was to eliminate the duplicative 
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The member countries of the European Community had already 
committed themselves to harmonizing their national patent laws, 
first via the Strassbourg Convention of 1963,23 and again in 1973 via 
the European Patent Convention ("EPC").24 For some countries, 
these agreements committed the signors to make numerous, basic 
changes in how they approached patenting.25 By the late 1970's, 
these changes were on the verge of becoming reality. 
One such harmonization-driven change was Germany's re-
moval of a grace period26 from its patent laws. Prior to harmoniza-
tion, the German patent system contained a grace period for certain 
types of pre-filing disclosures.27 The substantive provisions of the 
Strassbourg Convention and the EPC, however, did not contain a 
administrative work that occurred in handling essentially duplicate patent 
filings. 
23. Strassbourg Convention of 1963, reprinted in GERALD PATERSON, THE 
EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM 701 (1992) (requiring the adoption of similar rules of 
substantive patent law). 
24. European Patent Convention, reprinted in Leaffer, supra note 6, at 143 
(creating a single examination proceeding to obtain national patents in member 
countries). 
25. The Strassbourg Convention defines the substantive law of patents in 
relatively complete detail. One author asserts that its creation was driven by 
the desire of members of the European Community to preclude the use of na-
tional patent laws as barriers to trade. PATERSON, supra note 23, at 16 (1992) 
(noting that, prior to the formation of the Strassbourg Convention, "the exist-
ence of separate national patents for the same invention was seen as a mecha-
nism whereby trade barriers could be maintained, contrary to the newly 
emerging European interest in a common market ... "). 
The EPC took effect on October 7, 1977. Leaffer, supra note 6, at 141. 
Driven by that event, a number of European countries passed patent statutes 
with substantial new provisions. E.g., Law No. 78-742 of July 13, 1978, transla-
tion as amended reprinted in 3 WIPO, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAWS AND TREA-
TIES, France, 2-001 (1993) (moving from registration system to an examination 
system); Patents Act 1977, reprinted in 3 WIPO, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAWS 
AND TREATIES, United Kingdom, 2-001 (1993). Professor Ullrich, for example, 
asserts that France had no obviousness standard for patents until that time. 
Beier & Schricker, supra note 3, at 133 n.11. For a discussion of the changes in 
British patent law, see CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF PATENT AGENTS, C.I.P.A. 
GUIDE TO THE PATENTS Acrs (1990). 
26. Generally speaking, the term "grace period" refers to the time interval 
prior to filing for patent during which a patent system will excuse various pub-
lic disclosures and/or commercialization of the invention. See generally Grace 
Period for Public Disclosure of an Invention Before Filing an Application, 
WIPO Doc. No. GP/CE/I/2 Rev. (1984) (general study), reprinted in 1984 IN-
DUS. PRoP. 314. The time period in the United States is currently one year, 35 
U.S.C. § 102(b), although it has varied during history. E.g., Patent Act of 1839, 
ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat. 353, 354 (providing two-year grace period); Patent Act of Aug. 
5,1939, ch. 450, § 1, 53 Stat. 1212 (providing current grace period of one year). 
As an alternative, a national patent system may refuse to excuse any such 
activities prior to filing. E.g., Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6,5 Stat. 117, 119. 
Patent systems incorporating this latter standard are said to operate under the 
principle of "absolute novelty." 
27. See section two, Law of Jan. 2, 1968, translation reprinted in JUGEN 
VON UEXKULL, GERMAN PATENT LAw, UTILITY MODEL LAw, AND TRADEMARK 
LAw 11 (1968) (6-month grace period for acts based on invention of applicant). 
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grace period.28 Thus, when Germany implemented the Strassbourg 
Convention via its Patent Act of 1980, it was forced to remove the 
grace period provisions from its nationallaw.29 
At least some interests regretted this change.3o As a result, 
they began pressing for developments that would restore a grace 
period to the German system.31 In particular, WIPO agreed to con-
vene a committee of experts to study the possibility of obtaining a 
multilateral treaty that would call for the use of a grace period.32 
The strategy was apparently to obtain an agreement encompassing 
countries beyond the EC, and then to press for a corresponding 
amendment to the European Patent Convention.33 
In 1983, these two efforts coalesced into the process of negotiat-
ing at the Patent Harmonization Treaty. The· experts meeting 
before WIPO soon realized that the specifics of a grace period also 
brought into play other, related issues of patent law, both proce-
dural and substantive.34 Thus, in order to be successful at defining 
a grace period, the subject matter under discussion in the WIPO 
negotiations could not be circumscribed narrowly. In addition, the 
ongoing nature of the discussions between the EPO, JPO, and 
USPTO apparently increased the willingness of those entities to in-
clude procedural questions within the negotiations before WIPO. 
WIPO therefore terminated the work of its initial committee of 
experts after that body had met for one session. To replace the 
28. Article 52 of the EPC, for example, requires that patentable inventions 
be new. Article 54 defines "new" to mean anything that "does not form part of 
the state of the art," i.e., everything not "made available to the public ... before 
the date of filing." The EPC thus adopts the requirement of absolute novelty. 
29. Compare, e.g., the provision cited supra note 27 with sections one and 
three of the German Patent.Act of December 16, 1980, translation reprinted in 
Beier, supra note 21. 
30. For example, the Association for the Protection of Industrial Property 
(AIPPI) and the International Federation of Patent Agents (FICPI) passed res-
olutions in.support of a general grace period. 1984 INDUS. PRoP. at 320. Beier, 
supra note 21, at 19. 
31. Joint Hearings on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978 Before the Senate Subcommit-
tee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks and the House Subcommittee on 
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House and Senate 
Committees on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (statement of Harold 
Wegner) [hereinafter Wegner]. As of this writing, the transcript of this hearing 
has not been published. 
32. See generally WIPO, Meeting Note on the First Session of the Committee 
on Experts on the Grace Period for Public Disclosure of an Invention Before 
Filing an Application, 1984 INDUS. PRoP. 313, and the documents cited therein. 
33. Cf. 1984 INDUS. PRoP. at 324 (asserting international treaty on grace pe-
riod to be "preferable" because it would create "momentum for changing na-
tional laws"). The operation of the grace period provision in the Patent 
Harmonization Treaty is strikingly similar to the operation of the pre-EPC pro-
vision in the German national patent law. Compare the sources cited supra 
notes 7 and 27. 
34. WIPO History, supra note 5, ~ 3. 
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committee, WIPO created a second committee whose mandate ex-
tended beyond the issue of harmonizing national provisions relating 
to a grace period, and into the broader question of harmonizing pat-
ent law generally.35 This second committee of experts has now met 
on eleven occasions.36 As one might expect, it initially continued 
the former committee's consideration of a grace period, and addi-
tionally considered related procedural and substantive issues.37 
Throughout the course of its meetings, the committee's activities 
have expanded to include numerous other issues relating to patent-
ing.3S The product of its efforts is the Draft Proposal of the Patent 
Harmonization Treaty, which WIPO published in November of 
1990.39 
B. Structure of the Treaty 
Presently, the Patent Harmonization Treaty is structured as a 
Special Agreement under the Paris Convention.4o Twenty four of 
the treaty's thirty nine articles address substantive issues of patent 
law. The other articles relate to procedural or administrative treaty 
matters.41 Furthermore, a number of the articles are now 
35. Id. ~ 4. 
36. See the sources cited supra note 7. 
37. This new committee initially considered the additional issues of naming 
the inventor, whether an oath should be required, and the requisites for estab-
lishing a filing date. Note on the First Session, 1985 INDUS. PRoP. 267. 
38. By WIPO's own count, the committee considered new issues in the fol-
lowing pattern: 2d session, four; 3d session, three; 4th session, six; 5th session, 
part I, one; 5th session, part 2, three; 6th session, five. Many new issues appear 
to have been considered at the 7th and later sessions. WIPO appears to have 
abandoned from that point on the practice of reporting the prior history of the 
issues under negotiation. It is not clear whether WIPO originally contemplated 
covering as many issues as the treaty now does. 
39. See supra note 8. 
40. WIPO History, supra note 5. Article 19 of the Paris Convention permits 
the members of the Paris Union to enter into special agreements, to further the 
convention itself, provided they are not inconsistent with the convention. The 
European Patent Convention is an example of such an agreement. See gener-
ally Beier, supra note 21, at 13-14. 
41. See Appendix A for a list of articles from the Basic Proposal 
Of these articles, WIPO has now proposed omitting numbers 10, 19, 22, 24, 
25 and 26 from the treaty. Memorandum of the Director, supra note 8, at ~~ 7-8; 
Observations o/the International Bureau Following the First Part (1991) o/the 
Diplomatic Conference, WIPO, Doc. PLT/DC/69 (Jan. 29, 1993) [hereinafter 
Observations]. It has also proposed removing the preamble. 
The two stated reasons for this recommendation are that the articles are 
controversial, and that they overlap with provisions proposed in the TRIP's ne-
gotiations in GATT. Memorandum of the Director, supra note 8, ~~ 7-8. The 
sufficiency of this latter justification, however, appears to be questionable. The 
GATT negotiations are at a standstill. In addition, the draft intellectual prop-
erty provisions of GATT have drawn considerable criticism. See supra note 3. 
Thus, it is very uncertain whether the intellectual property provisions in the 
current GATT draft will ever become effective. See, e.g., Gutterman, supra 
note 3, at 111. 
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presented in alternative forms that are to be the subject of further 
negotiations.42 
The scope of the treaty is wide. It addresses, at least in broad 
terms, virtually the entire field of patent law. Included are detailed 
provisions relating to questions such as statutory subject matter,43 
novelty,44 obviousness,45 and the rights conferred by patenting46-
matters that are now governed by other, different provisions in the 
patent law of the United States.47 In addition, however, the Patent 
Harmonization Treaty also addresses legal questions that the 
United States has never committed to statute, such as the proper 
definition of the doctrine of equivalents48 and the role of the specifi-
cation in construing claim scope.49 By any objective measure, the 
treaty is clearly a comprehensive attempt to fix the law of patents 
into a definite, particularized set of legal standards, to a degree far 
beyond anything the United States has previously attempted. 50 
C The Diplomatic Coriference 
Obviously, WIPO has no power to accept treaties on behalf of 
the member states of the Paris Union. Both conceptually and prac-
tically, the work of WIPO's second committee of experts has been 
only preliminary to the creation of the Patent Harmonization 
Treaty. The committee's task has been to define a proposed treaty 
in sufficient detail that the Paris Union has a realistic chance of 
agreeing on a final text through the formal mechanism of a diplo-
matic conference.51 
In October of 1989, WIPO decided the draft treaty had 
progressed to the point where a diplomatic conference could be held 
42. PLT, supra note 8, arts. 8-10, 19-20, 22, 24-26. 
43. [d. art. 10. 
44. [d. arts. 11(2), 12, 13. 
45. [d. art. 11(3). 
46. E.g., PLT, supra note 8, arts. 19, 20. 
47. For a discussion of the specific differences, see Richard C. Wilder, An 
Overview of Changes to the Patent Laws of the United States After the Patent 
Law Treaty, 26 J. MARsHALL L. REV. 497 (1993). 
48. PLT, supra note 8, art. 21(1). 
49. [d. art. 21(2). 
50. On the degree to which the United States patent law is currently de-
fined by statute, see Pasquale J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 
at 1-10, reprinted in Title 35, U.S.C.A. (1954 ed.) ("While patents are creatures 
of statute, the entire body of patent law is much fuller than the statute itself, 
inclucling a vast amount of case material .... "). 
The Patent Harmonization Treaty is also to be accompanied by regulations 
that amplify and define the language of the treaty itself. PL T, supra note 8, art. 
29. Thirteen such regulations are currently proposed, although the treaty con-
templates that additional regulations can be added by a three-fourths vote of 
the Assembly of the Paris Union. [d. art. 29. 
51. See, e.g. General Rules of Procedure, WIPO Doc. No. 399(E)Rev.3, at 25-
26 (1990). 
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in June 1991 to consider the matter. 52 Supporters hoped the text of 
the treaty could be agreed upon and signed at that time.53 During 
the Spring of 1991, however, various events upset those hopeful 
plans. WIPO's committee had held its meetings in Geneva, Switzer-
land, making the negotiations inaccessible to many interested per-
sons.54 In addition, WIPO had pushed the committee of experts to 
complete a draft treaty quickly. 55 This effort outstripped the ability 
of the interest groups in the United States to consult their consiitu-
encies meaningfully prior to the negotiations. 56 Indeed, the pace of 
negotiations arguably outstripped even WIPO's ability to inform the 
public through its own publications. 57 
52. WIPO, Note on the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference for the Con-
clusion of a Treaty Supplementing the Paris Convention as Far as Patents Are 
Concerned, 1991 INDUS. PRoP. 360 [hereinafter Note on the First Part of the Dip-
lomatic Conference]. 
On its face, it may appear odd for WIPO to decide that the Patent Harmoni~ 
zation Treaty would be ready for the Paris Union's full consideration two years 
in advance. At this point it may be useful to note that the intellectual-property 
negotiations of GATT, see supra note 3, have taken place concurrently with 
WIPO's work on the Patent Harmonization Treaty. The negotiations have ad-
dressed many of the same issues. See supra note 41. 
This other, rival regime for patent harmonization poses threats to WIPO. 
If comprehensive patent-harmonization provisions are finalized in GATT 
before the Patent Harmonization Treaty comes into being WIPO risks losing 
much of the institutional control it now holds over international patent matters. 
See generally Beier & Schricker, supra note 3, at 18-30, 75-92. WIPO therefore 
has considerable reason to push the negotiations over the Patent Harmoniza-
tion Treaty to a rapid conclusion. See infra note 55. Indeed, some of WIPO's 
interests favor creation of the Patent Harmonization Treaty independent of 
whether that treaty is sound as a matter of international patent policy. 
53. It is clear that WIPO originally thought the Paris Union would finalize 
the treaty at this conference. See Note on the First Part of the Diplomatic Con-
ference, supra note 52, at 360. 
54. As noted supra note 18, the USPTO has not included private-sector rep-
resentatives in the official delegations of the United States to the negotiations. 
It apparently decided to rely on interested persons attending the negotiations 
independently. 
55. See Kirk, supra note 22, at 605 (describing WIPO as "pushing" the har-
monization negotiations "on a fast track"). WIPO's Committee of Experts met 
from July 1985 to November 1990 at an average of once every five months. 
56. See, e.g., Minutes of the 1991 Midwinter Meeting of the Council of the 
ABA Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law, ABA-PTC, 1990-91 AN-
NUAL REPORT 23, 25 (reporting statement by William Brunet that the short time 
period between WIPO's issuance of the draft treaty and the scheduled begin-
ning of the diplomatic conference "presents a timing problem"); see also Fryer, 
supra note 5, at 246 (noting lack of time to prepare for WIPO meeting and need 
for interest groups to act "immediately"). 
57. The Committee appears to have set the topics for each meeting no ear-
lier than the preceding meeting. See, e.g., Note on the Third Session, 1987 IN-
DUS. PRoP. 204, 207-08; Note on the Fourth Session, 1988 INDUS. PROP. 174, 183, 
185-86; Note on the Second Part of the Fifth Session, 1989 INDUS. PRoP. 52, 59-60, 
62. WIPO's International Bureau, moreover, which acted as Secretariat at the 
negotiations, often did not publish summaries of meetings for two to three 
months. See generally WIPO's Meeting Notes supra note 7. It appears, in fact, 
that the International Bureau of WIPO at times placed items on the agenda for 
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As a consequence. several members of the Paris Union were in 
fact less willing to make concessions than their negotiating delega-
tions had indicated during the meetings of the committee. 58 Per-
haps the most prominent example of such unwillingness involved 
the United States' position on changing to a "first-to-file" priority 
rationale. In a move not widely noted at the time, the Commis-
sioner of Patents and Trademarks had indicated to the committee 
of experts in 1987 that the United States would be willing to con-
sider changing its national law of patents in such a manner.59 Sub-
sequent drafts of the treaty incorporated that offer of change.60 In 
early 1991. however, the PTO realized that the relevant groups in-
side the United States did 'not strongly support such a change.61 
Therefore, the United States proposed that the treaty include an 
alternative provision that would allow the United States to retain 
its first-to-invent priority rationale, but make other, hopefully off-
setting changes in its laws.62 
The net effect of these late movements away from consensus 
was to prevent the Paris Union from finalizing the treaty at the 
June 1991 session of the diplomatic conference.63 The Paris Union 
a meeting and issued explanatory reports only after the conclusion of the last 
preceding meeting. See, e.g., Note on the Second Session, supra note 7, at 311. 
58. See, e.g., Harry Manbeck, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, 
Address to the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference (June 19, 1991), excerpt 
reprinted in BNA PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT DAILY, Sept. 4, 1991 [herein-
after Manbeck Speech]. Gutterman, supra note 3, at 107. 
59. International Developments/Patents: U.S. Offers to Adopt First-to-File 
as Part of a Balanced Package of I«iforms, 33 BNA PAT. TRADEMARK & COpy-
RIGHT. J. 581 (1987). See Note on the Third Session, 1987 INDUS. PRoP. 204, 205 
(noting U.S. delegation's statement that it would be "favorably inclined to con-
sider" changing priority rule). 
60. E.g., Draft Treaty on the Harmonization of Certain Provisions in Laws 
for the Protection of Inventions, WIPO Doc. No. HL/CE/IV 12, art. 301 (1987) , 
reprinted in 1988 INDUS. PRoP. 179, 187-88 (draft treaty for discussion at fourth 
negotiating session). 
61. See, e.g., Kirk, supra note 19, at 442 (observing that, as of January 1991, 
"no organized support" beyond a "few individuals" was being shown in favor of 
adopting a first-to-file priority system in the United States). Letter of Hon. 
Harry Manbeck, Comm'r. of Patents, to Arpad Bogsch, Dir. General of WIPO, 
Feb. 22, 1991, reprinted in 5 WORLD INTELL. PRoP. 93-94 (1991) (asserting lack 
of support for a first-to-file system in the private sector in the United States). 
62. Draft Articles 9, 11" and 13, The United States of America, Doc. 
PLT/DC/6 (Mar. 1, 1991), reprinted in Records, supra note 5. See generally 
USPTO Proposes First-to-Invent Option in Harmonization Treaty, 5 WORLD IN-
TELL. PRoP. 93 (1991); Kirk, supra note 19, at 442 (discussing substance of 
proposal). 
63. See Note on the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference, supra note 52, 
at 360. This document reports that Paris Union Assembly decided, in April 
1991, to shorten the duration of the June 1991, session of the diplomatic confer-
ence and continue the conference into a second part. WIPO abandoned its at-
tempts to finalize the treaty in 1991 at this time. See also WIPO Postpones 
Decision on U.S. Proposal to Change International Patent Law, BNA PAT. 
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT DAILY, May 1, 1991 (discussing WIPO's decision to 
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therefore extended the conference to include a second, future ses-
sion.64 Originally unscheduled,65 that second session was to be held 
in the summer of 1993.66 Changes associated with the new presi-
dential administration, however, have rendered the United States 
unable to fully participate by that date. During the preparation of 
this paper, WIPO therefore postponed the second session of the dip-
lomatic conference indefinitely.67 
postpone consideration of the United States' proposed amendments to the Paris 
Convention). 
For reports of the generally divisive effects of these late developments, see, 
e.g., Manbeck Speech, supra note 58; Joint Hearings on S. 2605 and HR. 4978 
Before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks and 
the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration 
of the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary, 138 CONGo REc. D487 
(statement of the Hon. Harry Manbeck, Commissioner of Patents and Trade-
marks) (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1992) [hereinafter Manbeck Statement] (describing 
reaction of foreign delgations to United States proposal); William J. & Michael 
N. Meller, Report on Diplomatic Con,ference for Patent Harmonization Treaty, 
BNA PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT DAILY, Sept. 4, 1991. 
Some foreign interest groups, however, were receptive to the alternative 
U.S. proposal. See, e.g., International Federation of Industrial Property Coun-
sel, FICPI Position Paper for the Diplomatic Con,ference for the Conclusion of a 
Treaty Supplementing the Paris Convention as Far as Patents Are Concerned 
(Patent Law Harmonization Treaty), at 1-2 (May 6, 1991) [hereinafter FICPI 
Position Paper]; Remarks of Bardehle at the Spring-Stated Meeting of the 
AIPLA (May 2, 1991), 1991 AIPLA BULL. 633, 636 (July-Sept. 1991). 
64. See, e.g., Note on the First Part of the Diplomatic Con,ference, supra note 
52. 
65. Id. 
66. See Memorandum of the Director General, supra note 8 for a descrip-
tion of the rescheduled second session. 
67. Report of the Assembly, Twentieth Session (10th Extraordinary) WIPO 
Doc. No. PI Alxxl1 (Apr. 5, 1993). Those in the United States who favor harmo-
nization have labored during the interim to create a consensus in favor of the 
treaty. The Intellectual Property Section of the American Bar Association, for 
example, was asked at both its 1991 and 1992 annual meetings to adopt a 
number of resolutions in favor of harmonization. Action taken on resolutions 
at the Annual Meeting in Atlanta, Georgia - August 1991, 10 PTC Newsletter, 
No.1, 3 (1991); Action taken on resolutions at the Annual Meeting in San Fran-
cisco, California - August 1992, 11 PTC Newsletter, No.1, 9 (1992). The Advi-
sory Commission on Patent Law Reform addressed several of the specifics of 
harmonization in its September 1992 Report to the Secretary of Commerce. Re-
port to the COmmissioner, 41-72 (1992). The leadership of the American Intel-
lectual Property Law Association continues to support harmonization strongly. 
See, e.g., 1991 Annual Meeting Report of the Harmonization Committee, 1991 
AIPLA BULL. 128 (Oct.-Nov. 1991). 
Perhaps the most important of these efforts is the legislation that was in-
troduced in Congress during 1992, and which will probably be reintroduced in 
1993. See supra note 11. Generally speaking, that legislation seeks to place the 
United States on record as favoring the Patent Harmonization Treaty. 
The odd structure of the legislation shows that the pro-harmonization 
forces in the United States are at this time concerned primarily with resistance 
that is domestic, and not foreign. The legislation does not simply authorize 
representatives of the United States to pursue negotiations. Rather, it seeks to 
commit the United States, in advance, to adopt what are considered to be the 
major concessions in substantive patent law that harmonization would involve. 
E.g., S. 2605, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 2 (1991) (amending Title 35 U.S.C. to incor-
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II. PRIOR HARMONIZATION EFFORTS 
The facts set out in the foregoing section are, to many, the com-
plete history of the Patent Harmonization Treaty. In reality, how-
ever, the treaty is only the latest in a long series of international 
agreements that have addressed foreign patenting. Many such 
agreements exist already.68 Generally speaking, all involve patent 
harmonization to some extent: they provide for the coordination, 
between countries, of national legal provisions relating to patents.69 
Patent harmonization is therefore an old concept and not a new 
one.70 
Common sense suggests that this prior history is relevant to the 
Patent Harmonization Treaty. The basic structure of international 
patenting transactions remains unchanged from at least the 1800's: 
an inventor seeking foreign patent rights must enter the legal sys-
tem of that foreign country and submit to its requirements for pat-
enting.71 Patent systems remain instruments of national policy.72 
For these reasons, the basic problems of international patenting, 
and the general concerns that affect their resolution, should be 
porate first-to-file priority). The effective date of the legislation will be tied to 
the date on which Japan and Europe adhere to the treaty. Thus, a major con-
cern among pro-harmonization forces in the United States at this time clearly is 
convincing foreign delegations that the United States wants to harmonize. 
68. The first and most notable is the Paris Convention, but others, such as 
the Patent Cooperation Treaty, 28 T.I.A.S. 7645 (1970), and the European Pat-
ent Convention, reprinted in PATERSON, supra note 23, at 499, are also well 
known. 
69. See supra note 1 for a definition of harmonization. 
70. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 49 (noting that "[t]he dream of many [who 
participated in the creation of the Paris Convention] was complete uniformity 
of the laws protecting industrial property in all nations."); Beier, supra note 21, 
at 5; EMERSON STRINGHAM, PATENTS AND GEBRAUCHMUSTER IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAw 45-62 (1935). 
71. See generally WIPO, General Information, 15-16 (1992); William R. Cor-
nish, The International Relations of Intellectual Property, 52 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 
46,47-48 (1993). One alternate structure is agreement to rely on an extra-na-
tional process for the grant of national patents. An example of this structure is 
the reliance, by the member countries of the EPC, on the granting procedure 
before the European Patent Office. See European Patent Convention, art. 64, 
reprinted in Leaffer, supra note 6, at 167 ("A European patent shall ... confer 
on its proprietor, ... in each Contracting State in respect of which it is granted, 
the same rights as would be conferred by a national patent granted in that 
State."). The provisions of Chapter II of the Patent Cooperation Treaty have 
this same general structure, although they not binding as yet. Another struc-
ture involves agreement to rely on initial grant and liability determinations that 
are both extra-national. The Community Patent Convention, reprinted in 1 
MARy VITORIA ET. AL., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNITED KINGDOM & EUROPEAN PAT-
ENT LAW 5001 (1990), is an example of such an agreement, although it is not in 
force. The United States has never been party to any such agreement. 
72. See, e.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 88-89; Beier, supra note 21, at 9; 
Cornish, supra note 71, at 47-48. The assertion results from the fact that na-
tional patent systems remain the creation of individual national governments. 
See generally Beier & Schricker, supra note 3, at 136-38. 
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largely unchanged.73 
The following discussion therefore examines the history of 
multilateral efforts to address foreign patenting. The examination 
is general; its purpose is not to review that history in full detail.74 
Rather, the examination uses history to test certain assertions re-
garding the motivations and systematic behavior of the participants. 
A. International Patenting Prior to the Formation of 
Multilateral Agreements 
The national patent systems that existed prior to the Paris 
Convention often contained widely varying legal rules.7s The 
United States, for example, examined patent applications substan-
tively,76 while many European countries did not.77 Most countries 
published the technical disclosures of patent applications upon 
grant, some held the disclosures in secret until after the patent ex-
pired,78 while still others published the disclosure immediately 
upon filing.79 Generally speaking, the variation between national 
73. It is certainly true that the amount of international trade has increased 
greatly since the 1800's. See, e.g., infra notes 12-15. How this trend should 
affect the debate over international patenting, however, is unclear. Increasing 
international trade has doubtless made it increasingly important that we re-
solve the issues of international patenting correctly. Yet international trade 
includes both imports and exports. As the following discussion demonstrates, 
the mere fact that international trade has increased therefore does not deter-
mine, per se, which resolution of the issues is proper. 
74. Sources discussing this history in the English language are extremely 
sparse. Almost no original documents exist in that language prior to 1900. See, 
e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ApPOINTED TO REVISE THE STATUTES RE-
LATING TO PATENTS, TRADE AND OTHER MARKS, AND TRADE AND COMMERICAL 
NAMES UNDER ACT OF CONGRESS ApPROVED JUNE 4, 1898, S. Misc. 20, 56th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1902). Later summaries include PENROSE, supra note 20, at 42-
57; LADAS, supra note 20, at 59-68: Beier, supra note 21, at 1; STRINGHAM, supra 
note 69 at 45-62; ULF ANoERFELT, INTERNATIONAL PATENT LEGISLATION AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 65-92 (1971). Kronstein & Till, supra note 20. The 
literature in French and German is apparently much more extensive. 
75. See generally PENROSE, supra note 20, at 1-18. For a modern discussion 
of these divergencies from the viewpoint of a patent lawyer, see LADAS, supra 
note 20, at 20-27. 
76. The United States instituted its system of examining patent applications 
substantively in 1836. The move was in reaction to the high frequency with 
which patents issued under the prior registration system were being invalidated 
in court actions. 
77. See, e.g., CHARLES S. WHITMAN;PATENT LAws AND PRACTICE OF OB-
TAINING LETTERS PATENT FOR INVENTIONS (1871). The French system was the 
most notable example of such a registration system. [d. at 152; LADAS, supra 
note 20, at 23-24. Italy examined only applications for inventions that related to 
beverages and food. WHITMAN, supra, at 165. 
78. Austria and the Netherlands, for example. WHITMAN, supra note 77, at 
63-64,174. 
79. This was certainly the practice of countries that awarded patents via 
registration. See supra note 77. In addition, England and Germany advertised 
pending applications prior to grant. LADAS, supra note 20, at 23-24. 
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provisions at the time appears to have been substantially larger 
than exists today.80 
These variations in national patent practices created proce-
dural obstacles to the international assertion of patent rightS.81 In 
those countries that published patent disclosures immediately upon 
filing, for example, the mere act of applying for patent disclosed the 
invention publicly. At the same time, other countries conditioned 
patentability on absolute novelty worldwide.82 Applying for a pat-
ent in one country could thus create an absolute barrier to ob-
taining a valid patent in another.83 
These procedural obstacles to patenting generally appear to 
have arisen inadvertently. There also existed at this time, however, 
another category of obstacles that national governments had er-
ected purposefully. The obstacles in this second category were es-
sentially protectionist.84 By the late 1800's European and United 
States scholars had explored the economics of patenting exten-
sively.85 As explained below, many granting sovereigns had begun 
to manipulate their national patent laws to enrich themselves in 
relation to their trading partners. 
1. The protection of national wealth from foreign patenting 
Patent systems are large-scale governmental intrusions into 
the free-market economy. They involve manipulating social costs 
and benefits to increase the national wealth.86 Perhaps the most 
significant cost of such systems is the higher prices imposed on con-
80. The improved situation today may be due to the normalizing influence 
of the harmonization agreements that have already been put into place. PEN-
ROSE, supra note 20, at 1. 
81. See LADAS, supra note 20, at 22. 
82. Ladas lists these countries as including France, Spain, Sweden, and It-
aly. Id. at 22-23. 
83. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 69-70; LADAS, supra note 20, at 26. Ladas 
asserts that filing applications simultaneously in multiple countries was the 
only means of assuring the issuance of corresponding foreign patents. 
84. E.g., Fritze Malchup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the 
Ninetheenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. I, 28-29 (1950); PENROSE, supra note 20, 
at 88-89; ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 99-100. Cf. Beier, supra note 21, at 9. As 
to the general validity of this dual categorization of patenting obstacles, see, e.g., 
LADAS, supra note 20, at 20. 
85. This literature is summarized in Patent Controversy. Malchup & Pen-
rose, supra note 84, at 9-10. The economic analyses of patenting in the 1800's 
were said to compare favorably with the literature on the subject offered as 
recently as the 1950's. Id. 
86. E.g., Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property and the Economics of 
Preemption, 76 IOWA L. REV. 959, 962 (1991). See, e.g., VICTOR ABRAMSON, THE 
PATENT SYSTEM: ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BASIS, PATENT STUDY No. 26 OF 
THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHT OF THE COMMITTEE 
ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE UNITED STATES SEN., 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1958) 
(reports in this set are hereinafter referred to individually as Patent Study No. 
-). MALcHUP, supra note 16. at 58. 
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sumers of the patented advance.87 If the patented technology has 
some economic value88 the patent owner is able to impose single-
source pricing on it - a price that is higher than would exist in a 
truly competitive market.89 
Patent systems exist because this social cost of higher prices is 
presumed to result in an increased pace of invention.90 Higher 
prices transfer increased amounts of money from consumers of the 
patented technology to producers. Knowing this, inventors will 
strive to invent patentable technology more vigorously. Some will 
succeed who otherwise would have failed. The sophistication of the 
country's industrial base thus increases, and new technology be-
comes available to consumers. According to the presumption, the 
social benefits of this increased rate of invention are large enough 
to more than offset the costs of patenting.91 
In a purely domestic economy the national effects of these costs 
and benefits are linked together relatively tightly. Each unit of in-
creased cost imposed on domestic consumers provides a unit of in-
creased revenue to domestic industry. Evaluating such a patent 
system therefore involves, in large part, estimating the amount of 
increased invention that will actually result from a given increase 
in expected revenue.92 In addition, the increased resources diverted 
to a domestic patent owner are not wholly lost to the domestic econ-
omy. Rather, the domestic patent owner generally will reinvest all 
or a part of those resources, thereby mitigating the cost of patenting 
to some degree.93 
International patenting, on the other hand, de-couples the na-
tional effects of patenting. Assume that an inventor exploits the 
advance through patenting, not in his or her own country, but in a 
foreign country. In that situation industry domestic to the inven-
87. The result is society's underutilization of the advance. E.g., ANDERFELT, 
supra note 74, at 58. MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 60-62. 
88. Of course, technology is not necessarily valuable merely because it has 
been patented. See, e.g., DONALD CHISUM, PATENTS § 4.02 (1992) (economic ra-
tionale for minimal utility requirement in the United States); SCM Corp. v. 
Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981) (relation of patent rights to market 
power in antitrust context). The text means to restrict the discussion to those 
patented advances that consumers find desireable over pre-existing technology. 
89. E.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 195-99 (2d ed. 
1977); Kitch, supra note 16, at 266-67; MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 58-60. 
90. See, e.g., MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 44-45; PENROSE, supra note 20, at 
94. 
9l. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 55, 76-79; RAYMOND VERNON, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL PATENT SYSTEM AND FOREIGN POLICY, PATENT STUDY No.5, 6 (1957). 
92. E.g., MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 63-66; Richard P. Merges & Richard R. 
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 878-
80 (1990). 
93. See PENROSE, supra note 20, at 145-60. Cf. MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 
79. 
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tor's own country receives increased profits from patenting, but do-
mestic consumers do not pay the associated higher prices. Instead, 
the higher prices are imposed on consumers in the foreign coun-
try.94 International patent transactions therefore reallocate wealth 
away from the granting country and into the country of the patent 
owner.95 
Prior to the Paris Convention many countries had acted on this 
basic economic truth. Their national laws included numerous, va-
ried provisions that curtailed the domestic patent rights of foreign 
nationals. Some countries, for example, had adopted compulsory-
licensing provisions.96 By their very nature, compulsory licenses 
lower the cost of the patented advance closer to multiple-source 
pricing.97 In addition, if the complusory license is given to a domes-
tic entity a portion of the foreign trade is prevented outright.98 
Both these mechanisms reduce the amount of wealth that flows out 
of the country into the hands of the foreign patent owner. 
Another type of protectionist provision motivated by the same 
economic calculation was the widespread presence of national 
working requirements.99 Generally, these provisions required pat-
ent owners to supply domestic demand for the patented technology 
94. Cf MALcHUP, supra note 16, at 79. In addition, the probability that the 
patent owner will reinvest the proceeds from patenting into the economy of the 
granting country is in all likelihood reduced. See, e.g., VERNON, supra note 91, 
at 7. The mitigating influence on the cost patenting discussed supra note 93, is 
thus removed. See e.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 145-60. Cf ANDERFELT, 
supra note 72, at 80-81. 
95. MALcHUP, supra note 16, at 55; PENROSE, supra note 20, at 95-96. See 
also ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 127-29; VERNON, supra note 91, at 12-13. 
96. E.g., LADAS, supra note 20, at 26; MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 5. See 
generally FREDRIK NEUMEYER, COMPULSORY LICENSING OF PATENTS UNDER 
SOME NON-AMERICAN SYSTEMS, Patent Study No. 19 (1959). PENROSE, supra 
note 20, at 164-69. 
97. E.g., MALcHUP, supra note 16, at 73-74. VERNON, supra note 91, at 13. 
The difference is roughly the cost of the royalty. Most systems require that the 
royalty be assessed at a level that is reasonable. The inherent indeterminacy of 
this standard, coupled with the fact that its calculation is ultimately in the 
hands of the granting nations' government, exposes foreign patentees to obvious 
risks. For a discussion of the effects of compulsory licensing in an international 
context, see PENROSE, supra note 20, at 152-68. 
98. Penrose asserts, for example, that this consideration motivated Eng-
land's introduction of compulsory licensing in its Patents Act of 1910. PENROSE, 
supra note 20, at 82 n.58. See also Kronstein & Till, supra note 20, at 778. 
99. E.g., ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 65-66, 99-100. VERNON, supra note 91, 
at 3; Montgomery, International Aspects of Patent Legi8lation, 31 J. POL. ECON. 
90,93-94 (1928). France appears to have been the most notable example. The 
laws of that country not only required the invention be worked domestically; 
they also forbade the importation of any product covered by a French patent. 
Thus, French demand could be supplied only by domestic French production. 
E.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 75. 
Ladas does not classify working requirements as protectionist measures. 
See generally LADAS, supra note 20. His work has been criticized, however, as 
unsophisticated in economic matters. 
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through domestic production. The failure to do so, resulted in the 
patent becoming invalid or unenforceable. Facially neutral with re-
gard to nationality, working requirements had an obviously greater, 
purposeful impact on patent owners who were foreign.1OO In es-
sence, foreign patentees were required to either abandon their pat-
ent rights or behave as if they were domestic entities. 
2. The protection of domestic industry from uneven 
international patenting 
In addition to increased prices, patents impose another social 
cost that is relevant to international patenting: they retard further 
research in the patented technology.101 Patents commonly domi-
nate inventions that remain to be discovered and patented them-
selves.102 Once a patent issues, therefore, every person other than 
the patent owner has a reduced expectation of return from further 
research in the areas of technology that the patent dominates.103 
Rationally, then, researchers will reduce their inventive efforts in 
technology that is dominated by another's patent.104 If competition 
100. E.g., ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 65-66; MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 17 
n.92; VERNON, supra note 91, at 35-36; PENROSE, supra note 20, at 143. A domes-
tic inventor will either already have production facilities that are located do-
mestically or, generally speaking, be able to arrange for the construction of 
facilities more easily than will a foreign inventor. 
101. E.g., Kitch, supra note 16; Merges & Nelson, supra note 92; Mark F. 
Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 
305 (1992); MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 63-64; KAUFER, supra note 16. 
102. The ability of patents to be related in dominant-subservient relation-
ships is well known. See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 16, at 268-69. Such patents are 
related in one of three ways: a patent to the generic invention may dominate a 
later-discovered specie; a patent to a subcombination may dominate later-dis-
covered combinations that incorporate the subcombination; and a patent to a 
product may dominate later-discovered methods of making and/or using the 
product. 
103. The owner of the dOminating patent will extract royalties from the in-
ventor of the improvement, thus forcing the newcomer to share his or her prof-
its. See, e.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 101-03. In addition, in countries that do 
not provide for compulsory licensing, the newcomer risks being denied com-
mercial use of the technology altogether by the dominant patent owner's re-
fusal to deal. A number of countries ameliorate this latter effect by giving 
compulsory licenses to owners of subservient, or "dependent," patents. See, e.g., 
NEUMEYER, supra note 96, at 28-30. 
104. Penrose cites as an example the stagnation of Britain's incandascent 
lamp industry in the 1800's after the initial grant of broad patents to a domestic 
entity. PENROSE, supra note 20. Merges & Nelson assert that the effect has 
recurred in a number of industries. Merges & Nelson, supra note 92, at 884-908. 
As a more recent example, a large United States manufacturer of health-care 
devices is reported to have moved a portion of its research fa<;ilities to Europe in 
response to another entity's dominant patent in this country. Thomas Burton, 
Aid/or Racing Hearts Could Also be a Boon to a Pacemaker Firm, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 12, 1993, at AI, A8. 
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spurs the speed of research,105 this reduction in competition will 
slow industrial development over time. The issue in a purely do-
mestic economy is optimally balancing the initial incentive to the 
original patent owner with the detriment to future researchers.106 
With international patenting, however, the problem becomes 
more complex. The teachings of an issued patent can travel beyond 
the borders of the granting sovereign and into other countries.107 
Corresponding patent rights in such other countries may, or may 
not, exist. lOS In countries where they do not, the public learns of 
the advance and yet is free from the economic impediment of domi-
nating patent rights. TechnolOgical development therefore contin-
ues unabated. In countries where dominant patent rights do exist, 
in contrast, only the holder of the dominant patent is fully moti-
vated to continue researching. Over time, this risks reducing the 
industrial sophistication of the patenting country in comparision to 
that of the non-patenting country.109 
lOS. Interestingly, lawyer-scholars active in the area have been unable to 
agree whether competition in research is economically efficient. Compare 
Kitch, supra note 16, at 276, with Merges & Nelson, supra note 92, at 871-78. 
The sources cited in the preceding footnote support the narrower proposition, 
made in the text, that competition increases the speed with which invention 
occurs. 
In any event, it would appear that the proposition in the text can be ac-
cepted as true for present purposes, inasmuch as patent systems reflect the gen-
eral attempt to increase the speed of innovation by fostering competitive 
research. E.g., MALcHUP, supra note 16, at 5O-S2. See generally WILLIAM G. 
SHEPHERD, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 14S-S1 (2d ed. 1985). 
106. See generally supra note 101. 
107. This can be due to any of a number of reasons, such as a national of one 
country gaining access to a copy of a patent granted in another, or because of 
international commerce in the patented good itself. See generally ANDERFELT, 
supra note 74, at 136-37; VERNON, supra note 91, at 17; PENROSE, supra note 20, 
at 100. Knowledge of the technology embodied in patented inventions appears 
to have traveled internationally routinely in the 1800's, particularly in Europe. 
With the common-language filings of the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the 
European Patent Convention, the availability of such foreign-patent teachings 
is probably far greater today. This ability to obtain technical information with-
out granting national rights to the inventor seriously undercuts any attempt to 
rely on the traditional rationale of fostering disclosure in the context of interna-
tional patenting. 
108. During the early time period under discussion, the time-wise duration 
of national patents varied greatly beween countries. E.g., LADAS, supra note 20, 
at 24-2S. 
109. See ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 137-39; Kronstein & Till, supra note 
20, at 774; PENROSE, supra note 20, at 133-3S. This fact casts serious doubt on the 
viability of Kitch's prospect theory of patenting. Kitch, supra note 16. Kitch's 
theory relies on the efficiencies that arguably arise from placing control of tech-
nological development in the hands of a single firm. It has been attacked with 
the argument that competitive research is more efficient. Merges & Nelson, 
supra note 92. 
At a more basic level, because the rights conferred by national patents are 
territorially limited, national patents do not provide the single-firm control 
over the patented technology upon which Kitch's theory depends. Instead, 
multi-firm competition to develop improvements is largely inescapable. Any 
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These economic considerations spurred a number of countries 
to act during the early period of international patenting. Primary 
among those actions were national provisions that caused domestic 
patents to expire as soon as any corresponding foreign patent ex-
pired.110 In operation, these provisions freed domestic industry 
from the constraining effects of patenting as soon as the industry in 
another country became free. 
In total, these various protectionist provisions inflicted im-
mense difficulties on patent owners,111 Often, one simply could not 
obtain patent rights in a foriegn country. Even if a foreign patent 
could be obtained, many times its continued existence depended on 
the patent owner rapidly initiating manufacture in that foreign 
country. This could be disadvantageous for many different 
reasons.1l2 
B. The Paris Convention 
Prior to the Paris Convention essentially no international 
agreements addressed the obstacles to international patenting set 
out in the preceding section,11a Instead, patent owners who wished 
to assert patent rights in foreign countries were forced to rely on 
their own resources. As a practical matter, they were forced to re-
strict the number of countries in which they sought patent 
protection. 
In 1883, a decade-long process of negotiation culminated in a 
number of countries signing the Paris Convention,114 Although the 
creation of the convention was an act of international diplomacy, 
the participants in the negotiations included not only representa-
tives of national governments, but representatives of industrial in-
terests as well.llS It appears, in fact, that the negotiations began 
attempt to rely on Kitch's prosect theory would therefore be largely futile. See 
generally PENROSE, supra note 20. 
110. See, e.g., LADAS, supra note 20, at 27-28. The United States had such a 
provision until 1897, when it was replaced by the predecessor of Title 35, U.S.C. 
§ 102(d) (1987). CHISUM, supra note 88, § 6.04[11. 
111. E.g., ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 65-66; LADAS, supra note 20, at 26-28. 
112. See, e.g., ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 138; PENROSE, supra note 20,.at 
107-08. See LADAS, supra note 20, at 29. 
113. Only two bilateral treaties regarding patents existed prior to the forma-
tion of the Paris Convention. LADAS, supra note 20, at 45-46. 
114. See sources cited supra note 74. The process involved congresses at two 
major industrial conferences, the International Exhibition of Vienna in 1873 
and the Paris Exhibition of 1878. In addition, the negotiators convened a third 
congress in Paris in 1880. 
115. E.g., ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 66-69. The large presence of indus-
trial interests during the negotiations has been detailed by various writers. E.g., 
PENROSE, supra note 20, at 45-57; Beier, supra note 21, at 2-3. Beier asserts that 
this influence has continued. Id. at 13. 
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primarily at the insistence of industrial interests.n6 
As the following discussion details, the Paris Convention ad-
dressed a portion of the obstacles to international patenting. At the 
same time, other obstacles remained unresolved.n7 This partial 
failure raises an immediate question: Why was agreement on those 
issues not reached? Many causes doubtlessly contributed.118 At the 
same time, however, the pattern of successes and failures suggests 
that the different economic interests of the various parties to the 
negotiations was a significant cause. In particular, agreement ap-
pears to have been possible only where the economic interests of 
national government and industry coincided.n9 
1. Patent owners vs. the national interest 
It is axiomatic that the interests of national government will 
tend to be national in scope. With regard to patenting, these inter-
ests will include the full range of social costs and benefits of a pat-
ent system: the potential benefits of an increased rate of 
innovation, for example, as well as the costs of higher consumer 
prices, the costs of adminstering the patent system, and the costs 
borne by other endeavors from whom the increased resources spent 
on patenting have been diverted.120 
This focus on both the costs and the benefits of patenting 
should also hold true with regard to transactions of international 
patenting. A national government will be concerned with the in-
creased incentive that patent rights in foriegn countries bestow 
upon its domestic industry.121 Government will also be concerned 
with the domestic costs of awarding patents to foreigners: the loss 
of national wealth from importation of patented goods, and the po-
tential stunting of domestic industry via international patenting 
that is uneven.122 
116. E.g., PENROSE, supra note 20. 
117. See infra notes 133-38. As to the results of the Paris Convention, 
Malchup states: "Only a few of the irksome problems of foreign patenting were 
solved and no progress was made toward the establishment of an 'international 
patent.''' MALcHUP, supra note 16, at 18. 
118. For a general discussion of the difficulties of harmonizing substantive 
patent law, see LADAS, supra note 20, at 13-16. 
119. Scholars in the field of negotiation theory agree that negotiated agree-
ments are possible generally only where the parties have compatible interests. 
See generally RoGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETIING TO YES 73 (1981); How. 
ARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 45 (1982). 
120. See, e.g., MALcHUP, supra note 16, at 63-65, for a review of the social 
costs and benefits of patenting. 
121. See generally VERNON, supra note 91, at 14; PENROSE, supra note 20, at 
114-15. 
122. See PENROSE, supra note 20, at 114 (noting that "[t]he question ... is 
whether the gain to any particular economy from obtaining patents in other 
HeinOnline -- 26 J. Marshall L. Rev. 480 1992-1993
480 The John Marshall Law Review [Vol. 26:457 
Industry's view of patenting, in contrast, is potentially quite dif-
ferent. Industry will be concerned with how patenting affects its 
own, private interests.123 Those interests will in all liklihood be 
very different from the interests of society as a whole.124 For exam-
ple, patent systems rely entirely on the incentive of increased prof-
its to spur innovative activity. Patenting therefore bestows large 
private benefits on industry.125 At the same time, the social costs of 
patenting are generally spread throughout society. They therefore 
impose private costs on industry to a much lesser degree.126 
This observation is very significant. Unless one views inventors 
as entitled to monopoly profits naturally, patent systems must be 
seen as societal mechanisms for providing an optimal amount of in-
centive to invent.127, To determine that amount of incentive, one 
must consider more than industry's narrow, private interests. The 
result of that broader calculation need not coincide with industry's 
preferences. Thus, society can prefer rules of patent law that indus-
try would not choose. Stated conversely, industry can prefer rules 
of patent law that are adverse to society. The differences of position 
between the two groups should be systematic.128 
For the same reasons, industry and national governments 
should also have systematically different interests with regard to 
countries is likely to offset the costs of granting domestic patents to foreign 
non-resident patentees"). 
123. E.g. MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 56-62. Malchup presents a summary of 
the concepts of private vs. social costs and benefits. [d. at 56-58. 
124. [d. 
125. See, e.g., id., at 58; PENROSE, supra note 20, at 126. Of course, the state-
ment in the text applies not to all industry, but to those industrial entities that 
expect to obtain significant patent rights. Firms that intend to seek patents 
more aggressively will therefore tend to weigh the benefits of patenting more 
strongly than will nonpatenting firms. Patent-seeking firms may be more prev-
alent in some industries than others. See generally Merges & Nelson, supra 
note 92. 
126. Of the various social costs identified by Malchup, only the costs of faster 
obsolescence and dominating patent rights appear to result in private costs that 
are concentrated in industry. MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 64. Of particular 
note, the costs associated with single-source pricing over the patented advance 
appear to be widely diffused throughout society. Kitch asserts that the courts 
have viewed such output restrictions as the main cost of patenting. Kitch, supra 
note 16, at 282. 
127. That is, the amount of incentive at which the social gains from further 
induced invention begins to fall short of offsetting the associated increase in 
social costs. See, e.g, PENROSE, supra note 20, at 94-95. 
128. This proposition is a basic one that has been repeatedly understood in 
the scholarly literature, although not always considered worthy of express 
statement. See, e.g., ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 99; PENROSE, supra note 20, 
at 91, 126. It is expressly stated here in recognition of the fact that some mem-
bers of the patent bar either disagree or have not considered the matter in 
depth. 
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international patenting.l29 If they behave rationally according to 
economic criteria, national governments· will be interested in ob-
taining agreements that maximize the wealth of their individual 
countries. These will be agreements whose operation bestows on 
the particular national economy both large benefits and small costs 
from international patenting.l30 Industry, in contrast, will seek the 
private benefits of increased international patentingl3l but will be 
relatively unconcerned with any associated social costs. In particu-
lar, industry will be largely unconcerned with whether a dispropor-
tionate share of such costs falls on any particular national economy, 
including that of its own country.l32 
In essence, because the parties to an international sale of a pat-
ented item each belong to a different national economy, their pri-
vate costs and gains become social costs and gains for the countries 
involved. For example, where a national of the country under con-
sideration holds a foreign patent, the sale of goods under that pat-
ent transfers wealth out of the foreign country into the hands of the 
patent-owning national. The national's private gain is thus a social 
gain for the national's own country. Conversely, where a country 
has granted one of its patents to a foreigner, the domestic sale of 
goods under the patent impoverishes domestic consumers and en-
riches the foreign patentee. The consumer's private cost is thus a 
social cost to the granting country. The outlook of national govern-
ment differs from that of its patent-owning industry because the 
nation participates in both import and export transactions, while 
industry is largely preoccupied with exports. 
2. The agreement to foster increased foreign patenting 
The structure of the Paris Convention is consistent with the 
operation of these economic interests. Foreign patenting, for exam-
129. See generally ANOERFELT, supra note 74, at 76-77; Beier, supra note 21, 
at 13-20. 
130. See, e.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 114-15, 119-20, 123. 
131. Again, to the extent that the individual industrial entities expect to re-
ceive significant patent rights in foreign countries. E.g., PENROSE, supra note 
20, at 115. See supra note 125. 
This factor can explain why independent inventors and small businesses 
have stich small enthusiasm for the Patent Harmonization Treaty. See, e.g., 138 
CONGo REC. H7370-72 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1992) (statement of Rep. Bentley). Ob-
taining and enforcing patents in foreign countries is notoriously difficult. Large 
corporations with heavy R&D expenditures and extensive foreign sales can 
generally overcome these difficulties. Independent inventors and small compa-
nies, in contrast, are generally less able to do so. Because these groups are less 
likely to obtain the benefits of increased foreign patenting the associated costs 
may become relatively more significant to them. 
132. Cf, PENROSE, supra note 20, at 131 (concluding that some form of inter-
national patenting is necessary to prevent stronger industrial countries from 
forcing weaker industrial countries to accept oppressive patent agreements). 
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pIe, is crucial to the objectives of both industry and national govern-
ment. Patents provide the market power that yields increased 
profits to industry. If such increased profits are to be had on for-
eign sales, industry must obtain foreign patents. Those same in-
creased profits on foreign sales, moreover, appear to be the major 
mechanism by which countries enrich themselves through interna-
tional patenting.133 National government is thus interested in 
seeing its citizens obtain as many foreign patents as possible. Addi-
tionally, foreign patents are needed to constrain the industrial de-
velopment of competing countries while an advance is subject to 
domestic patent rights. 
For these reasons, one would expect easy agreement in the 
Paris Convention to increase the general availability of foreign pat-
enting. The interests of national governments are more or less the 
same on this particular issue.134 In addition, the self interests of 
national governments and industry generally coincide. 
The original text of the Paris Convention shows such easy 
agreement on this issue through the concept of foreign priority: 
Anyone who shall have regularly deposited an application for a 
patent of invention ... in one of the contracting States, shall enjoy for 
the purpose of making the deposit in the other States ... a right of 
priority under the periods hereinafter determined. 
In consequence, the deposit subsequently made in one of the other 
States of the Union, before the expiration of [this] period cannot be 
invalidated by acts performed in the interval, especially by another de-
posit, by the publication of the invention or by its working by a third 
133. See, e.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 113-14, 119-20. Foreign patents 
owned by entities domestic to a particular country can be counted as additions 
to that country's national wealth. See, e.g., MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 55. 
134. This statement is subject to at least one major caveat. Some countries 
may have few domestic inventors and thus be less likely to obtain foreign pat-
ents even in an "open patenting" regime. Undeveloped and less developed 
countries present particular examples. Such countries may well conclude that 
the gains from a greater freedom to patent internationally are, from their na-
tional perspective, at best hypothetical. See, e.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 96, 
115-17. Anderfelt's work explores various implications of this problem. See also 
Douglas F. Greer, The Case Against the Patent System in Developing Countries, 
8 J. INT'L. L. & ECON. 223 (1973) (concluding that the costs which less developed 
countries incurr from international patenting outweigh the potential gains 
which such countries will receive); Gutterman, supra note 3, at 89. There are 
indications, however, that this issue was not present in the initial negotiations 
over the Paris Convention. ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 92 (asserting that 
original negotiations included only industrialized countries and those with no 
national patent systems). More recently, increasing numbers of less developed 
countries have become signatory to the Paris Convention. E.g., ANDERFELT, 
supra note 74, at 92-97; Beier, supra note 21, at 14-15. This has led to the in-
creasing occurrance of "north-south" splits in international patenting issues, as 
developing countries act on their main interest of stopping the outflow of 
wealth to foreign patentees. E.g., EC Officials Express Concern over Unresolved 
TRIPs Issues, 5 WORLD INTELL. PRoP. REP. 215 (1991) (describing "clear north-
south split" over the patentability of pharmaceuticals). See generally 
ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 133-35; Beier, supra note 21, at 14-20. 
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party .... 135 
As a result of this provision, an inventor could establish a date of 
filing in all member countries via an initial filing in a single coun-
try. The act of applying for patent rights on the same invention in 
several foreign countries was therefore made much easier.136 
3. The failure to stem protectionist provisions 
As to protectionist provisions, the economic interests of na-
tional government and patent owners appear to diverge. National 
government is critically interested in retaining the freedom to im-
pose protectionist provisions. By definition, these provisions reduce 
the outflow of national wealth to foreign patentees. They are an 
important means of minimizing the domestic costs of international 
patenting. 
Industry, in contrast, will be generally opposed to protectionist 
provisions. Protectionist provisions reduce the market power of in-
dustry's foreign patents. Industry will therefore object to their 
presence in the patent sytems of foreign countries and will seek 
their abolition. In addition, because others pay the private costs of 
increased patents on imports, industry has little reason to favor pro-
tectionist provisions in the domestic patent system of its own 
country. 
Under an economic analysis, therefore, patent-owning industry 
will seek broad prohibitions against protectionist measures. In con-
trast, each national government will seek to preserve at least those 
protectionist provisions that operate to the country's own net bene-
fit. Based upon these fundamentally different interests one would 
expect difficulty in achieving any agreement to eradicate protec-
tionist provisions generally. 
The historical course of negotiations over the Paris Convention 
is consistent with this analysis as well. The original text of the 
Paris Convention contained conspicuously little with regard to the 
two most widespread protectionist measures, working requirements 
and compulsory licenses: 
The introduction by the patentee into countries where the patent 
has been granted, of articles manufactured in any other of the States of 
the Union, shall not entail forfeiture. 
The patentee, however, shall be subject to the obligation of work-
ing his patent conformably to the laws of the country into which he has 
135. Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Paris, Mar. 20, 
1883, art. 4, 1 T.S. 80, 82. The provisions relating to industrial models, designs. 
and trademarks are omitted. Originally six months, the period of priority for 
inventions is now one year. Stockholm Revision, art. 4(c), 21 U.S.T. 1629. 1632. 
136. See generally PENROSE, supra note 20, at 67-71, 90; LADAS, supra note 
20, at 93. 
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introduced the patented articles.137 
The text did require signatories to permit importation. At the same 
time, it specifically allowed the continued existence of national 
working requirements generally. It did not mention compulsory 
licenses at all. l38 
4. The selection of national treatment 
In addition to the principle of foreign priority, the Paris Con-
vention also adopted the principle of national treatment. "The sub-
jects or citizens of each of the contracting States shall enjoy, in all 
other States of the Union, so far as concerns patents for inventions, 
. . . the advantages that the respective laws thereof at present ac-
cord, or shall thereafter accord to subjects or citizens."139 Stated 
simply, national treatment requires each government to apply the 
sanle provisions to both its own citizens and foreign nationals.140 It 
has been described, along with the principle of foreign priority, as a 
fundamental tenet of the convention.141 
The Paris Union's agreement to provide for national treatment 
stands in apparent opposition to the economic analysis suggested in 
this article. At least in theory, national treatment prevents govern-
ments from employing the most effective tool for reducing the do-
mestic cost of international patenting: expressly denying domestic 
patent rights to foreign inventors.142 In addition, the Paris Union 
consciously selected national treatment over the competing princi-
ple of reciprocity.143 Under reciprocity, each government need 
137. PLT, supra note 8, art. 5. 
138. For discussions of the effect of this article in its initial form, see PEN. 
ROSE, supra note 20, at 74-87. 
139. PLT, supra note 8, art. 2. See generally Beier & Schricker, supra note 3, 
at 83-87; PENROSE, supra note 20, at 64-67. 
140. E.g., Beier & Schricker, supra note 3, at 83; PENROSE, supra note 20, at 
64-65, Beier, supra note 21, at 9. 
141. See, e.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 66; Beier, supra note 29, at 84; 
ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 70; LADAS, supra note 20, at 265; VERNON, supra 
note 91, at 2. 
142. Although such provisions were no longer widespread by the 1870's, at 
an earlier time it was apparently common for national governments to refuse 
patents to foreigners outright. See LADAS, supra note 20, at 27. The United 
States patent had such a provision in its laws from 1793 to 1836. See Moy, supra 
note 17, at 789 n.42. Canada, as another example, had such a provision until the 
early 1870's. See, e.g., Annual Report of the Commissioner of Patents, 1873, at 
13-14. 
National treatment also leads, by short extension, to the abolition of provi-
sions that link the expiration of domestic and foreign patents. See generally 
LADAS, supra note 20, at 505-07; PENROSE, supra note 20, at 71-74. Although not 
in the Paris Convention originally, this prohibition appeared in the Washington 
Revision of 1911. E.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 72. 
143. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 64; Beier, supra note 21, at 8-10; LADAS, 
supra note 20, at 269-70. 
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award to foreign inventors only those patent rights that the foreign 
inventor's own government awards to non-nationals.144 Reciprocity 
would thus seem a favorite of national governments: under it, the 
cost of awarding domestic patents to foreigners is tied directly to 
the benefits that domestic industry receives from patenting in for-
eign markets.145 
What, then, does the Paris Union's selection of national treat-
ment imply? Does it invalidate the assertion that economic self-
interest explains the Paris Convention's substantive provisions? 
More broadly, does it show the Paris Union to have adopted an in-
ternationalist, free-trade approach to foreign patenting? 
When examined carefully, the adoption of national treatment 
probably does not support these suppositions. Reasons completely 
apart from a free-trade rationale can cause government to favor na-
tional treatment over reciprocity. A country applying reciprocity, 
for example, must be expert in the patent laws of every foreign 
country. Reciprocity thus risks large administrative costS.146 
In addition, a deeper examination shows that national treat-
ment still permits government many forms of protectionist behav-
ior in patenting.147 Still possible, for example, are provisions that 
are facially neutral with regard to nationality, but which impact 
foriegners disproportionately. Working requirements and compul-
sory licenses are examples of two such provisions;148 the restric-
tions in United States law against proof of invention by foreign 
activities are another.149 
Another, more subtle type of protectionist provision permitted 
under national treatment involves reducing the domestic costs of 
patenting generally. The loss of domestic wealth to foreign paten-
tees can occur only when domestic patenting results in valuable 
144. E.g., Beier, supra note 21, at 8; Bogsch, supra note 21, at 196-97; William 
R. Cornish, The Canker of Reciprocity, 10 EUR. INTELL. PRoP. J. 99 (1980). 
145. Elements in France, for example, objected to the use of national treat-
ment in the convention. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 65-66. Various authors 
assert that the United States has historically pressed for reciprocity with the 
most vigor of any country in the Paris Union. Id. at 66; ANDERFELT, supra note 
74, at 73 n.26; LADAS, supra note 20, at 270. The United States has recently 
made reciprocity the basis of protection for foreign nationals in the Semi-Con-
ductor Chip Protection Act. 17 U.S.C. §§ 902(a), 914. 
146. E.g., MALcHUP, supra note 16, at 138; LADAS, supra note 20, at 269; 
Bogsch, supra note 21, at 197; M. Osterag, International Unions for the Protec-
tion of Literary, Industrial, and Artistic Property, 25 MICH. L. REV. 107, 110-11 
(1926). 
147. Indeed, national treatment appears to have been the norm in national 
patent laws even prior to the Paris Convention. LADAS, supra note 20, at 27-28, 
47-48. 
148. See supra notes 96-100. Strict working requirements, in fact, can have 
very nearly the same effect as refusing to grant patents to foreign inventors 
altogether. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 111, n.2. 
149. Moy, supra note 17, at 788. 
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rights. Thus, government can reduce the outflow of wealth to for-
eigners by simply reducing the economic value of the domestic pat-
ent rights that are available. Indeed, the loss can be reduced to zero 
by refusing to grant domestic patents altogether.150 
The Swiss patent system provides a historical example of a na-
tional government employing this latter technique.151 Switzerland 
progressed through the industrial revolution without a patent sys-
tem.152 The economic rationale behind this decision was sound: 
without domestic patents Swiss consumers paid no increased prices 
for new technology. Switzerland thus minimized the outflow of its 
wealth to importers. Indeed, refusing to issue patents removed all 
the social costs of patenting from the domestic Swiss economy.153 
At the same time, Switzerland continued to receive most of the ben-
efits of patenting. True, Swiss industry could not expect patent 
profits from introducing new technology into the domestic Swiss 
economy. The absence of domestic patents, however, gave Swiss 
industry free access to all the new technology that others devel-
oped. In addition, Swiss industry held patents in foreign coun-
tries,154 thus earning patent profits from exports and receiving an 
incentive to invent in that way. In fact, because the the Swiss econ-
omy was small, the incentive that Swiss industry received from pat-
ented exports was arguably greater than the incentive that 
dominating the domestic Swiss economy via patenting might have 
supplied. 155 
National treatment provided no obstacle to this strategy. The 
original Paris Convention did not commit its members to provide 
any minimum rights to patentees.156 Thus Switzerland could, and 
in fact did, adhere to the Paris Convention even though it had no 
150. Cj Bogsch, supra note 21, at 196-97. This can also be done selectively by 
refusing to grant patents in particular technologies. Switzerland did so for a 
time, for example, with regard to process technology. ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIAL-
IZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS 85-87 (1971); PENROSE, supra note 20, at 
124. Modem examples include the exclusion of pharmaceuticals and food prod-
ucts from patentable subject matter in the patent laws of various countries. See 
generally Gutterman, supra note 3, at 125-36. 
151. There are at least several sources that discuss, in the English language, 
the development of the Swiss patent system during the 1800's and early 1900's. 
Schiff, supra note 150, at 85-126; Penrose, supra note 20, at 16-17, 120-24; Kaufer, 
supra note 16, at 9-10, 48; Kronstein & Till, supra note 20, at 774-79. 
152. See SCHIFF, supra note 150, at 85-95. 
153. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 122. 
154. E.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 121; SCHIFF, supra note 150, at 103-04. In 
some countries, Swiss inventors "took out more patents per head of the domes-
tic population than did inventors of any other nation." SCHIFF, supra note 150, 
at 90. 
155. Cf ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 129-31; SCHIFF, supra note 150, at 100; 
PENROSE, supra note 20, at 117-24 (discussing importance of foreign patenting to 
countries with small domestic economies). 
156. E.g., Beier, supra note 21, at 11. 
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patent system whatsoever.l57 Its denial of patent rights equally to 
domestic nationals and foreigners satisfied the requirement of na-
tional treatment. Additionally, adhering to the Paris Convention 
guaranteed Swiss inventors national treatment from foreign gov-
ernments, thereby ensuring Swiss industry access to patent profits 
on its exports.l5S In fact, Switzerland did not find it in her interest 
to enact a national patent system until Germany threatened her 
with retaliatory tariff action.l59 
C Multilateral Negotiations Subsequent to the Original 
Paris Convention 
Subsequent negotiations to revise the Paris Convention have 
continued to follow this pattern.l60 It has been increasingly possi-
ble to harmonize the procedural requirements of patenting.l6l At 
157. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 65. The Netherlands also adhered to the 
Paris Convention without a national patent system. E.g., ANDERFELT, supra 
note 74, at 71; Beier, supra note 21, at 10-11. 
158. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 121. 
159. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 16-17; Kronstein & Till, supra note 20, at 
778-79. Recognizing the existence of this mechanism raises interesting ques-
tions about the current Japanese patent system. That system has been criti-
cized as failing to provide meaningful rights, particularly to foreign inventors. 
E.g., Hearing on the Effect of the Japanese Patent System on American Busi-
ness Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Com-
mittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, 100th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (June 24, 1988); Hearing on Japanese Patent Policy Before the 
Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 
(Feb. 28, 1989). The provisions of the Patent Harmonization Treaty that place 
maximum time limits on examination, for example, Basic Proposal, art. 16, are 
commonly regarded as being directed against the Japanese. 
The current Japanese economy has several qualities that are similar to the 
economy that apparently existed in Switzerland in the second half of the 1800's: 
a relatively high degree of industrialization; a significant reliance on the export 
of manufactured, and hence potentially patentable, goods; a propensity for ob-
taining patents in foreign countries; and an overall size that represents a small 
domestic market in relation to the export market. See generally SCHIFF, supra 
note 149, at 90-101. In addition, at least some segments of Swiss industry feared 
that they were less innovative than foreign entities, and thus at risk of being 
dominated by foreign-owned patent rights, an accusation that some United 
States industrialists have leveled at Japan. E.g., Id. at 92; PENROSE, supra note 
20, at 16, 123-24. 
Japan may thus be benefiting from trade distortions that are the result of a 
general absence of a domestic patent system, much as Switzerland did in the 
late 1800's. See generally SCHIFF, supra note 150, at 101-06. For discussions of 
the relationship between substantive Japanese patent law and Japan's national 
trade interests, see Carter Mackley, The Role of the Patent System in Technol-
ogy Transfer: The Japanese Experience, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 131 
(1987); Guntram Rahn, The Role of Industrial Property in Economic Develop-
ment: The Japanese Experience, 14 IIC 449 (1983). 
160. E.g., Beier, supra note 21, at 12 (asserting pattern of attempts to include 
minimum standards in revisions to the Paris Convention). 
161. See STRINGHAM, supra note 70, at 126-30. Article 4 of the convention, 
for example, has expanded massively, and now treats numerous procedural 
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the same time, agreement to limit the use of national patent provi-
sions for protectionist purposes has not progressed very far. The 
Paris Union has repeatedly revisited the issues of working require-
ments and compulsory licensing since 1883.162 The resulting provi-
sions place very few restrictions on national governments that wish 
to use these mechanisms. Compulsory licenses can be granted as 
soon as three years after the patent issues. The patent can be re-
voked for failure to work two years thereafter.163 Perhaps more 
significant, even today the Paris Convention contains virtually no 
requirements that national governments grant any other minmum 
rights to patent holders.l64 Indeed, the Convention still does not 
even require that national governments enact patent systems at 
all. 165 
This reluctance to forego protectionism has shown itself 
outside the Paris Convention as well. The substantive standards in 
Chapter II of the Patent Cooperation Treaty are expressly non-
binding;166 the patent standards to be added to GA TI' are in sharp 
dispute.167 Even the one exception to this trend, the binding sub-
cases in relatively minute detail. Stockholm Revision, arts 4-4quater, July 14, 
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1629, 1631-36. 
162. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 78-87; ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 72-92; 
LADAS, supra note 20, at 68-89. Penrose describes these provisions as the "most 
controversial" in the convention. 
163. The relevant portions of article 5 now read: 
A. - (1) Importation by the patentee into the country where the pat-
ent has been granted of articles manufactured in any of the countries of the 
Union shall not entail forfeiture. 
(2) Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative 
measures prOviding for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the 
abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights con-
ferred by the patent, for example, failure to work. 
(3) Forfeiture of the patent shall not be provided for except in cases 
where the grant of compulsory licenses would not have been sufficient to 
prevent the said abuses. No proceedings for forfeiture or revocation of a 
patent may be instituted before the expiration of two years from the grant 
of the first compulsory license. 
(4) A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of 
failure to work or insufficient working before the expiration of a period of 
four years from the date of filing of the patent application or three years 
from the date of grant of the patent, whichever period expires last; it shall 
be refused if the patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons. 
21 U.S.T. 1636-37. 
164. See Beier, supra note 21, at 79, 96 (noting that the Paris Convention 
does not call for the provision of sufficient national laws); Kirk, supra note 22, 
at 601 (asserting that the Paris Convention provides for essentially no minimum 
standards). 
165. E.g., ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 95, 114. Anderfelt suggests that 
changes to article 17 during the Lisbon Revision of 1958 may obligate members 
of the Paris Union to enact patent systems. Id. at 114. He admits that at least 
one country did not adopt that interpretation. 
166. PLT, supra note 8, art. 64(1). 
167. See the authorities cited supra note 3. 
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stantive standards in the EPC,l68 is anomalous: the EPC exists only 
among a small number of countries that are party to a broad, prior 
commitment to internationalism amongst themselves.169 
III. ANALYSIS 
The nature of the Patent Harmonization Treaty becomes clear 
when viewed in light of the foregoing history. Despite the practi-
cally continuous efforts of patent owners, the international commu-
nity has never agreed to provide meaningful minimum standards of 
patent protection to patentees. The treaty is another effort to ob-
tain those standards. Included in it are virtually all the substantive 
provisions that patent owners have sought historically and been 
denied. 
Additionally, the interest groups that are at odds over the 
treaty remain essentially unchanged from prior harmonization ef-
forts. International, patent-owning industry continues to seek 
broad substantive rights in all countries.170 Governments continue 
to seek the freedom to impose national laws that favor domestic 
development. 171 
In short, the Patent Harmonization Treaty is simply the newest 
vehicle in an ongoing debate. That debate existed long before the 
treaty was proposed. It will likely continue long after the treaty is 
either signed or abandoned. 
A. Evaluating the Patent Harmonization Treaty 
This context suggests a number of analyses that might be use-
ful in evaluating the Patent Harmonization Treaty. First, imple-
168. Arts. 52-74, reprinted in PATERSON, supra note 23, at 523-30. See Beier, 
supra note 21, at 20. 
169. Members of the European Economic Community, who roughly make up 
the membership of the EPC, are signatory to the Treaty of Rome. See generally 
Moy, supra note 17, at 808-09 nn.137-38. 
170. The identity of the trade and industry groups that have appeared before 
WIPO are listed in meeting notes referred to at supra note 7. 
171. These differences can be seen in many of the disputes over specific pro-
visions of the treaty. E.g., PLT, supra note 8, art. 10 (fields of technology); Id. 
art. 19 (rights conferred by the patent); Id. art. 22 (patent term); Id. art. 25 (obli-
gations of the patent owner); Id. art. 26 (remedial measures for violation of art. 
25). 
Perhaps the clearest indication is in the dispute over the preamble of the 
treaty. The preamble is to be non-binding. Observations, supra note 41, at 5. 
Nevertheless, the various parties to negotiations cannot agree whether the 
Union "recogniz[es] the need to take into consideration the public policy objec-
tives underlying national patent law," and is willing to "tak[e] into account de-
velopment, technological, and public interest objectives" of its members. Basic 
Proposal, PLT, supra note 8, at 4. The preamble is one of the provisions of the 
treaty that the International Bureau has recommended deleting. See supra 
note 41. 
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menting the treaty will require the United States to change its 
domestic patent laws.172 As with all such proposed changes, we 
must analyze their purely domestic effect. Amending the law to 
change the rights of patent owners inevitably alters the balance be-
tween the social costs and benefits of patenting. We must therefore 
discern whether the changes required by the Patent Harmonization 
Treaty would improve the balance in the United States, or at least 
not damage it unacceptably. 
The debate over prior-user rights illustrates this point. Prior-
user rights, in the form under consideration, except prior users of a 
patented advance from the patent owner's control.173 They cur-
rently do not exist in the United States. Introducing them would 
necessarily reduce the profits that holders of United States patents 
could expect from commercial exploitation of their patent rights. 
This should directly reduce the incentive benefit of patenting.174 
At the same time, however, awarding rights to a prior user by 
definition creates a multiple-supplier market for the patented tech-
nology. Prior-user rights are thus a specific form of compulsory 
license. In general, they should drive the price of the patented tech-
nology down and decrease the social costs of patenting. From a 
purely domestic viewpoint, therefore, evaluating prior-user rights 
should involve calculating whether this decrease in social cost ac-
ceptably offsets the decrease in incentive benefit. 
In addition to domestic considerations, however, evaluating the 
Patent Harmonization Treaty will require us to analyze the treaty's 
effect on the flow of wealth across our national borders. Strong 
patent rights transfer increased amounts of wealth outside the 
country to foreign patentees, while weak patent rights transfer 
smaller amounts. Changing the economic rights of patent holders 
in the United States will inevitably change the size of this transfer. 
172. See Wilder, supra note 47. 
173. Article 20, paragraph 1 of the proposed treaty reads as follows: 
Not withstanding Article 19 ["Rights conferred by the Patent"], a pat-
ent shall have no effect against any person (hereinafter referred to as the 
"prior user") who in good faith, for the purposes of his enterprise or busi-
ness, before the filing date of where priority is claimed, the priority date of 
the application on which the patent is granted, and within the territory 
where the patent produces its effect, was using the inventionor was making 
effective and serious preparations for such use; any such person shall have 
the right, for the purposes of his enterprise or business, to continue such 
use or to use the invention as envisaged in such preparations. 
PLT, supra note 8, at 41. 
174. Joint Hearings on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978, Before the Senate Subcommit-
tee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks and the House Subcommittee on 
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House and Senate 
Committees on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (statement of Douglas Wyatt) 
(Apr. 30, 1992). 
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Prior-user rights again provide an illustration. The treaty calls 
for prior-user rights to be awarded only to prior users who are ac-
tive domestically.175 Such rights would thus remove wealth from 
patent owners, a class of persons in which foreign nationals can be 
numerically commonplace, and transfer it to domestic industry and 
consumers. Prior-user rights therefore protect domestic wealth 
from the incursions of foreign patentees.176 The interest in mini-
mizing outflow of the nation's wealth to foreigners argues for their 
introduction even apart from purely domestic concerns. 
As a still further issue the wealth-transfer effect of foreign pat-
ents suggests in fact that the United States examine carefully the 
basic assumption that increased patent harmonization is in the na-
tional interest. At least three major variables affect the losses that 
a country will suffer from foreign patenting: the size of the coun-
try's economy; the strength of the rights that the country's patent 
laws give to patentees; and the overall number of patents that the 
country grants to patentees who are foreign. The United States 
does not appear to fare well by any of these criteria. Its economy 
represents 30% of the world's consumption - by far the largest 
economy of any single country in the world. At the same time, 
United States patent laws provide patent owners with some of the 
strongest patent rights in existence.177 The United States currently 
grants 45% of its patents to foreigners, the highest percentage at 
any time in its history.178 
Taken together, these factors virtually assure that open inter-
national patenting will inflict a substantial loss of economic wealth 
175. The Patent Harmonization Treaty calls for prior-users rights based 
upon use "within the territory where the patent produces its effect." PLT, 
supra note 8, art. 20(1). The legislation previously before Congress would have 
granted prior-user rights only to those whose use was "in the United States." 
E.g., S. 2605, § 3(b) (proposing new 35 U.S.C. § 273(a». This national focus cor-
responds to nearly identical provisions in the national laws of other countries. 
E.g., Beier, supra note 29, at 14, 17. 
176. Article 4 of the Paris Convention, in fact, has always permitted the 
award of prior user rights by making the right of foreign priority "subject to the 
rights of third parties." E.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 68 n.18. 
177. E.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 1 n.1; LADAS, supra note 20, at 270. But 
see VERNON, supra note 91, at 4 (asserting antitrust limitations on patenting in 
United States to exceed those in foreign countries). The law of antitrust in the 
United States is less extensive today than 1957, the date of Vernon's writing. 
178. USPTO, Patents Issued by the Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. 
DEPl'. OF COMMERCE NEWS RELEASE No. 92-1 (Feb. 14, 1992). The latest statis-
tics are expected to show a very slight decline in this percentage. 
This percentage has increased drastically in the relatively recent past. At 
the turn of the century, less that 10% of United States patents were being 
granted to foreign nationals. COMM'R PATS. ANN REP. 1970, 11, 26. The percent-
age was below 20% throughout most of the 1960's. [d. Thus foreign patenting 
can be said to inflict much greater damage on the United States economy today 
than in earlier times. See generally VERNON, supra note 91, at 4; Greer, supra 
note 134, at 228-30. 
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on the United States. They suggest, in fact, that the United States 
may well suffer the largest such losses of any country in the 
world.179 
Put plainly, then, there are substantial reasons why the United 
States might lose, rather than gain, from a general increase in the 
amount of international patenting. The national interest may thus 
favor resisting patent harmonization. At the very least, we should 
submit to patent harmonization only. after comparing carefully 
what we will gain with what we will lose. 
B. Evaluating Industry's Advice 
Historical context also suggests how to evaluate industry's en-
thusiasm for the Patent Harmonization Treaty. Industry's enthusi-
asm should be suspect to the extent that it is the result of industry's 
own peculiar subset of interests in patenting. Inparticular, history 
and reason suggest that we should carefully examine whether in-
dustry has considered the social costs that increased international 
patenting will impose domestically. If industry's calculus excludes 
those costs its advice is not sound. 
A concrete example will illustrate how this evaluation might 
operate. The Patent Harmonization Treaty has been described, 
from the viewpoint of the United States, as a bargained-for ex-
change. The United States is offering to change its theory of prior-
ity from the current rationale of first-to~invent to the rationale of 
first-to-file. In return, the European Community will provide in-
ventors a grace period prior to filing. ISO 
Industry's endorsement of this bargain is understandable. A 
grace period would be more hospitable to inven,tors than Europe's 
179. The reevaluation suggested in the text may find historical precedent in 
the changing negotiating position of England, which went from supporting open 
international patenting strongly in the 1880's to advocating more protectionist 
agreements in the early 1900's. Anderfelt suggests that this change was driven 
by the rest of the industrialized world reaching rough parity with England's 
development at the end of the Industrial revolution. ANDERFELT, supra note 
74. See also PENROSE, supra note 20, at 140-41. 
It is important to note that deemphasizing multilateral patent harmoniza-
tion as a goal does not mean abandOning efforts to improve the rights of United 
States patentees in foreign countries. Bilateral mechanisms, such as actions 
under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1930, codified as amended in 19 U.S.C. 
§§ 1301, 1303, are available to change the behavior of the United States' trading 
partners. See generally DUVALL, supra note 3, at 591-93.· Generally speaking, 
use of these mechanisms would require the United States to offer fewer com-
mitments to change its own patent laws in return for concessions from foreign 
governments. 
180. E.g. Fiorito, supra note 5, at 88-89; Pagenberg, supra note 5, at 2, 7; Man-
beck statement, supra note 63. 
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current rule of absolute novelty.1S1 Marginally more European pat-
ents would issue to inventors under such a rule, thereby increasing 
somewhat the overall expectation within United States industry of 
profit from patenting in Europe.1S2 
At the same time, offering to adopt first-to-file priority will im-
pose increased costs on the United States. The United States' first-
to-invent provisions effectively discriminate against foreign inven-
tors in the race to obtain United States patents.1S3 Because few 
other provisions in United States patent law have this effect,l84 
first-to-invent priority may well be the major means by which the 
United States protects itself against the outflow of its wealth to for-
eign patentees.1S5 Changing to first-to-file priority will thus in-
crease the outflow of wealth from the United States, perhaps 
significantly. 
Industry's enthusiasm for the basic bargain of the Patent Har-
monization Treaty must therefore be viewed skeptically. Exchang-
ing a European grace period for first-to-file may provide the United 
States economy with a net gain. Industry, however, will not bear 
most of the costs that increased foreign patenting will inflict on the 
United States. Industry would probably support the treaty even if 
its operation would provide society with a clear net loss. 
Historical context also raises other issues. If the interests of 
industry and the nation are in fact different, adherence to proper 
181. Inventors who make public disclosures during the grace period will ob-
tain patents that would not be granted otherwise. 
182. Of course, this increase will apply to European inventors as well. The 
fact that European patenting interests also favor the use of a grace period is 
therefore not surprising. See supra note 30. 
183. Moy, supra note 17, at 784-88. 
184. United States patent law does not contain, for example, a working re-
quirement, compulsory licensing or prior user rights. It contains no selective 
exclusion of technological fields from patentable subject matter. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101. United States procedures for granting patents, moreover, operate with 
essentially equal efficiency on applications filed by nationals and foreigners. 
Thus, while the United States' first-to-invent provisions are less than perfectly 
internationalist, United $tates patent law as a whole is probably no more pro-
tectionist than that of foreign patent systems. See, e.g., Section 24, German Pat-
ent Act of 1980, reprinted in Beier, supra note 21, at 22 (setting out compulsory 
licensing and working requirements); Societa Italiana Brevetti, Bulletin on Pat-
ents and Trademarks in Italy, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y 484 (1992) 
(discussing compulsory licensing and working requirements in various Euro-
pean countries); Frederick M. Ritchie, So You Want a Commercially Important 
Patent in Japan!, 74 J.P.T.O.S. 186 (1992). The sources on Japanese patent 
practices cited supra note 158. Indeed, it may be considerably less so. 
185. The protectionist effects of the United States' first-to-file provisions 
have been noted by foreign interests during the WIPO negotiations. See, e.g., 
International Federation of Industrial Property Counsel, FICPI Position Paper 
for the Diplomatic Conference for the Conclusion of a Treaty Supplementing 
the PariB Convention as Far as Patents Are Concerned (Patent Law Harmoniza-
tion Treaty), at 1-2 (May 6,1991) (discussing result as "bias in favor of residents 
of the U.S."). 
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lawmaking processes becomes critical. Whether the treaty reflects 
the overall will of the United States, for example, should depend 
heavily on whether the various constituencies have been repre-
sented adequately. Yet, from the record it appears that industry 
has had a disproportionate role in defining the treaty before WIPO. 
Nearly all of the nongovernmental participants in the WIPO negoti-
ations have been from industrial and related interests.l86 One au-
thor has even suggested that industrial interests should control the 
debate within WIPO over patent harmonization.187 
Industry'S narrow interests, in fact, may have already influ-
enced how the United States is approaching international patenting 
generally. The Federal government has relied on several advisory 
committees in this area188 - advisory committees whose member-
ships have been drawn heavily from patent-owning industry.189 
The government's recent statements of policy reflect precisely the 
limited outlook that one would expect of industry.l90 Much atten-
tion has been paid to the increased revenues that industry could 
expect from stronger intellectual property rights abroad.19l In con-
trast, little or no attention has been paid to the costs that any con-
cessions will impose on the United States. Indeed, many of the 
documents prepared by the government and its advisory commit- . 
tees do not reveal an awareness that increased international patent-
ing will inflict any domestic costs. Observers can therefore wonder 
whether the flaws of the Patent Harmonization Treaty exist in 
186. See Moy, supra note 17, at 793-803. 
187. Beier, supra note 21, at 18. 
188. The advisory committees that have addressed international patenting 
issues since 1980 include the Advisory Commission of Patent Law Reform to 
the Secretary of Commerce, see A Report to the Secretary of Commerce (1992), 
the Industry Functional Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights 
for Trade Policy Matters to the Secretary of Commerce (IF AC 3) and the Advi-
sory Committee on International Intellectual Property to the Secretary of 
State. 
189. For example, of the twenty-five members and alternate members of the 
Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform, twenty were either employees of 
large patent-owning entities or private patent lawyers. Similarly, at least 31 of 
the 38 members of IF AC 3 were closely aligned with patent-owning industry. 
190. See, e.g., Administration Statement on International Trade Policy, Sept. 
23, 1985; U.S. Trade Representative, Oversight Hearing on Intellectual property 
and Trade Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the 
Administration of Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, 10lst Cong., 1st 
Sess. 27-61 (1989) (testimony of Carla Hills). 
191. Those efforts have included attempts to obtain greater protection, see 
Administration Statement on the Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property 
Rights Abroad, (Apr. 3, 1986); Statement by Secretary of Commerce Malcolm 
Baldridge on Proposed "Intellectual Property Rights Improvement Act of 
1986," (Apr. 7, 1986); Statement by Ambassador Clayton Yeutter Concerning 
Intellectual Property Rights Protection, (Apr. 7, 1986), as well as efforts to doc-
ument the amount of the potential gains. E.g., Foreign Intellectual Property 
Protection and the Effect on U.S. Industry and Trade, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. No. 2065 
(1988). 
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other international agreements that have been negotiated recently, 
such as NAFTA and the TRIPs portion of GATT. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Patent Harmonization Treaty is one of the most recent 
events in a historical series of international negotiations relating to 
patenting. In those negotiations, patent owners have sought to in-
crease their rights generally. National governments, in contrast, 
have tended to seek arrangements that provide net gains to their 
individual economies. Typically these objectives have been in oppo-
sition. As a result, international patenting agreements have not 
progressed very far, despite efforts that have now spanned more 
than a century. 
One can wonder whether the United States has been aware of 
this history in negotiating the Patent Harmonization Treaty. With 
regard to substantive, as opposed to procedural patent provisions, 
precious little of what occurred in the negotiations to date has been 
an altruistic exercise in international cooperation. Rather, the vari-
ous parties have consistently sought terms of agreement that fur-
ther their own self-interests. Certainly this has been true of the 
national governments; it has been equally true of private industry. 
Knowing this, one would expect the United States to have care-
fully measured the cost of each concession it has offered. Yet, this 
does not appear to be the case. No significant study appears to have 
preceded, for example, either the United States' offer to switch to 
first-to-file priority or its later, more limited offer of 
compromise.192 
More fundamentally, given the self-interested behavior of the 
parties one would expect the United States to have demanded high 
quality, representative input into the negotiations. Yet this may not 
have happened either. Patent-owning industry has had a large role 
in defining the United States's position on the Patent Harmoniza-
tion Treaty. Whether that industry has acted in the national inter-
est, rather than its own, is questionable. In any event, domestic 
United States industry appears to grasp the implications of interna-
tional patenting much less well than do foreign interests in the 
WIPO negotiations. 
192. See infra note 6. 
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